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This thesis argues that the trend of constantly chasing and changing attack vectors
is contributing to the continuity of attackers-led security vicious cycle. Attackers
are leading and defenders are learning. This paradigm needs to be shifted. This
thesis proposes an asset-based security system where security practitioners build
their security systems based on information they own. The idea is to completely
rely of ourselves in building security systems and require nothing from attackers.
This way, attackers chase defenders which will not just level the security play-
ing field but will give advantage to defenders. We utilize our vision by proposing
an asset-based approach to mitigate zero-day ransomware attacks. The obtained
results are promising and indicate that our prototype will achieve its goal of miti-
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 يراسلوب الهجمات المتغ التوجه الحالي القائم على التصدي للمهاجم من خالل مالحقة  في هذه الرسالة نناقش
 يتصدرون والمدافعون يتعلمونالمهاجمون ية الحلقة المفرغة التي يقودها المهاجمون. استمرار الذي ساهم في
 هذا النموذج يحتاج الى التغيير. تقترح هذه الرسالة نظام امن قائم على االصول حيث يقوم خبراء ,منهم
لى عوالفكرة من ذلك هو االعتماد بشكل كلي  علومات يملكونها,اعتمادا على م االمن ببناء انظمتهم االمنية
انفسنا في بناء االنظمة بدون الحاجة لمعرفة اي معلومة من المهاجم. بهذه الطريقة سيكون المدافعون هم 
فنكسب تحكم ورفع مستوى الملعب االمني باالضافة  اجمون هم الذين يطاردون ويتعلمون,المتصدرون والمه
 الى اعطاء افضلية للمدافعين.
نتائج للتخفيف من هجمات الفدية دون انتظار. ال  نحن نستخدم رؤيتنا من خالل اقتراح نهج قائم على األصول
ف من حدة فيالتي تم الحصول عليها واعدة وتشير إلى أن نموذجنا األولي سوف يحقق هدفه المتمثل في التخ





Valuable information and data need security solutions to stay out of reach of
attackers. In spite of continuous security solutions, attackers are still capable
of penetrating security systems causing damage to valuable data and affecting
economy impact [4] [5] [6] [7]. Each time security systems are penetrated, a patch
is needed to be placed to prevent the attackers from reaching valuable data [5].
This cycle cannot continue and a solution with new approach must be presented
to break this cycle.
The first step in building a security solution is to decide what needs to be
protected, which we will refer to as an asset. Assets can be any valuable resource
to the asset owner and can span over employee data, intellectual property, bank
accounts, and so forth. It is then up to the asset owner to decide on the security
requirements that need to be protected by the security system. As such, security
solutions are necessary to meet organization needs. Organizations basically need
to protect their assets. This is not enough for the organization as it needs to
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determine the value or the importance of these assets. The organization should
consider scenarios in which these assets are lost, stolen, compromised or corrupted.
As such, what is needed is to place a value in terms of time and money on each
category identified as valuable.
We start this chapter by section 1.1. Here, we highlight security attacks and
their economy impact, while section 1.2 elaborates on the continuous need for se-
curity systems. Section 1.3 identifies in details security stages. In section 1.4, we
explain the research problem and what motivated us to write this thesis. Objec-
tives of the thesis are outlined in section 1.5 while section 1.6 discusses the thesis
contributions. We present the organization of the thesis in section 1.7.
1.1 Attacks Economy Impact
During the first half of 2012, Hotmail, Azure, SkyDrive, MSN, Office 365, and
Twitter experienced an outage for few hours [8] and during the second half of 2012,
attacks targeted GoGrid [8], Dropbox [9] and Saudi Aramco [9]. Furthermore, a
virus, identified later as Stuxnet, sabotaged centrifuges for uranium enrichment
plant located in Iran. The attackers first infected five companies by targeting their
computers. These companies are believed to be connected to the Iranian nuclear
site. The Iranian attack is believed to spread through USB flashes [10] [11] [12],
exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities. Sony's PlayStation network, Epsilon, as
well as Stratfor [8] were hit by a data breach attack in 2011. Year 2009 was no
exception, Bit Bucket's server (which belongs to Amazon EC2 Cloud) went down
2
for 19 hours [8].
Two of the top ten attacks for 2014 listed in [13] compromised Gmail where
five million passwords were exposed. An attack also hit eBay compromising 145
million user accounts. Educational institutions are also targets for security attacks
[14]. Attacks hit Harvard University and Penn State University causing leakage
of students and faculty information [15]. In 2016, Kaspersky lab was also one
victim hit by Duqu 2.0 attack [15]. Cellebrite, a company that helped the FBI to
break the protection on a terrorist’s locked iPhone [16], was also hacked and its
products were publicly distributed. At the end of 2016, Shamoon 2 attack [17]
came back with new features since its appearance in 2012. This time, it achieved
its maximum damage to the oil sector in the Gulf area by overwriting the master
boot records and wiping entire hard disks.
Most of the damages come from zero-day attacks and ransomware malware.
A zero-day attack is an undisclosed vulnerability that hackers can exploit to ad-
versely affect computer programs [18]. A typical zero-day attack can last 10
months on average and can infect huge number of nodes. In a zero-day attack, at-
tackers target one or more security requirements of one or more assets. Attackers
change their attack vector in order to hide their behavior and avoid systematic
antivirus software [19]. Saudi Aramco was a victim of a zero-day attack in 2012.
These attacks stole usernames and passwords to access users accounts and infect
more than 30,000 Aramco workstations [9] [20]. Ransom malware is a type of
malicious software that blocks access to data or threatens to publish it unless a
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ransom is paid [21]. CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, WannaCry, Jigsaw, TeslaCrypt,
Bad Rabbit, and Petya are examples of famous and recent ransom malware [4].
A study done by Ponemon Institute [17] shows that business loss due to zero-
day attacks continues to climb by 19% and shows the average annual loss to
companies worldwide exceed 7.7 million dollars per company [22]. The average
data breach costs U.S. organizations approximately 6.5 million dollars [23]. An-
other study conducted in 2013 and is based on a sample of 252 organizations in
seven countries, concluded that 87% of small companies and 93% of large com-
panies reported some zero-day breaches [24]. Furthermore, the UK Government
estimated zero-day attacks will cost 27 billion Pounds per year.
One of the most famous and recent computer zero-day ransomware is Cryp-
toLocker [25] which costed 30 million dollars in 100 days with 500,000 victims,
with speculation that at least 0.4% of CryptoLocker victims end up paying the
ransom [26]. Another damaging incident is WannaCry [27] spreading in at least
150 countries costing an estimated losses that could reach 4 billion dollars [28].
1.2 Need for Security
As we move forward towards the ever increasing importance and continuous use
of data-age technology, security projects are becoming the primary focus for many
practitioners and research groups. A focus research group in Oxford University
[29] directs their research to find security solutions to insider threats initiated
directly from employees. Products [30] such as TRITON APX, TRITON AP-
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EMAIL, TRITON AP-WEB, TRITON AP-DATA and TRITON AP-ENDPOIN
are available to end users as content management solutions.
One of the lead companies in security and anti-virus solutions [31] conducts
a yearly cyber security competition to nurture the interest of talented people
and to raise users’ awareness for cyber security. Security solutions, such as the
ones offered by Optilab [32] designed to handle eavesdroppers and other security
threats, identify legitimate users by applying screen protection using cameras. If
the user is not identified, then the screen becomes blurry to protect the information
and the intruder photo is captured.
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [33], targeting to
achieve it’s core mission, is employing more than 240, 000 individuals in security
related sectors such as border and aviation security, emergency response, chemical
facility inspection, and cyber-security analysis. With securing cyberspace, DHS
funds a wide variety of cyber-security projects aiming at improving security in
federal and global networks. Some of these cyber-security projects are anony-
mous networks & currencies, critical infrastructure design and adaptive resilient
systems, and cyber-security forensics.
Helping victims of ransomware attacks to retrieve their original data by de-
crypting the files without paying the ransom to cyber criminals, was the main
idea behind establishing a website called www.nomoreransom.org. This is an ini-
tiative by the national high technology crime unit of the Netherlands’ police,
Europol’s European cybercrime centers, Kaspersky, and McAfee [34]. The es-
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tablished websites offer decryption tools to decrypt victim files hit by any ran-
somware listed on the websites, which are updated each time a new ransomware
is discovered. The list of ransomware include LAMBDALOCKER, NEMUCO-
DAES, MACRANSOM, JAFF, ENCRYPTILE, AMNESIA, AMNESIA2, MOLE,
BTCWARE, CRY128, CRY9, and CRYPTON. If a victim was hit by an unknown
ransomware, the victim needs to only upload a sample of the encrypted files to
the website where these infected files will be scanned to classify the type of ran-
somware. Once the ransomware is identified, a solution is provided.
Academics and researchers [19] [35] [36] are working to establish more secure
environments and reduce the big losses resulting from such attacks. Researchers
and academics started by surveying the existing attacks and collecting informa-
tion to know the power of these attacks and what damage they can cause [35].
Others studied the attack stages [37] to establish patterns of behavior in order
to match them to avoid and capture future attacks. As such, models can be
established to recognize and predict normal patterns or behavior and therefore
capture abnormalities. In [36] and [19] current attack solutions offered by com-
panies were assessed and innovative strategies were introduced to countermeasure
such attacks.
There is no doubt that security-related incidents are increasing. Specifically,
securing systems against attacks are surely needed and therefore a security solution
must be put in place to ensure that such attacks are prevented and countermea-
sured [37].
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1.3 Adaptive Security Life Cycle
Adaptive security architectures were recently proposed by [1] [38] [39] to illus-
trate the four stages in any adaptive security architecture as illustrated in Figure
1.1. Benefits of an adaptive approach to security include reducing the overhead
in terms of time and resources as well as empowering security teams and en-
gaging them in worthwhile activities that will limit serious damage and protect
against advanced threats. Adaptive security architectures suggest four stages to
the adaptive security life cycle:
Figure 1.1: Stages of an adaptive security architecture. Adapted from [1].
• Prevent: In this stage, known attacks are blocked before they create damage.
• Defect: In this stage, detection tools will reduce the impact of attacks,
propagated from the “Prevent” stage, by limiting the time these attacks
have to act on a system.
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• Respond: This stage investigates any security issues that are discovered in
the previous two stages. This will help avoid a recurrence of the same attack.
• Predict: In this stage, technology will be used to anticipate potential threats.
Protective measures may involve one or a combination of deterrence, avoid-
ance, prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that should form part of the
enterprise's security approach [40]. In addition, the term security has been defined
by many researchers. In [40], security is defined as “A condition that results from
the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable an enter-
prise to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to
its use of information systems”. Security is defined also as “A discipline concerned
with protecting networks and computer systems against threats such as hacking
exploits, malware, data leakage, spam and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, as well
as ensuring trusted access through mechanisms such as IPsec or SSL” [41]. Fur-
thermore, resiliency is the ability to quickly adapt and recover from any known or
unknown changes to the environment through holistic implementation of risk man-
agement, contingency, and continuity planning. Similar definition for resiliency
states that it is stated in the ability to continue to: (a) operate under adverse
conditions or stress, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, while maintain-
ing essential operational capabilities; and (b) recover to an effective operational
posture in a time frame consistent with mission needs.
From the definitions of security and resiliency, we notice that there are threats,
assets, and protection systems. Threats can cause possible harm and therefore
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they are dangerous if they can penetrate to our assets through exploiting a vul-
nerability. The role of the protection system is either deterrence, avoidance, pre-
vention, detection, recovery, or correction. These terms are defined in [40] [42] as
follows:
• Deterrence is reducing an intelligent threat by discouraging action, such as
by fear or doubt.
• Avoidance is reducing a risk by either reducing the value of the potential
loss or reducing the probability that the loss will occur.
• Prevention is impeding or thwarting a potential security violation by de-
ploying a countermeasure.
• Detection is determining that a security violation is impending, is in
progress, or has recently occurred, and thus make it possible to reduce the
potential loss.
• Recovery is restoring a normal state of system operation by compensating
for a security violation, possibly by eliminating or repairing its effects.
• Correction is changing a security architecture to eliminate or reduce the
risk of re-occurrence of a security violation or threat consequence, such as
by eliminating a vulnerability.
From the above definitions, we notice that resiliency deals with recovery and
correction. That is, resiliency comes into existence after detecting an attack [40]
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[42]. Resiliency is launched after a security breach is detected. Some sub-areas
of resiliency include positive network control, threat mitigation and incident han-
dling and forensics [43]. In [44], authors classify some resilience techniques as
proactive and reactive. Some of proactive techniques are segmentation, isolation,
randomness, and distribution. While reactive techniques include deception, dy-
namic reconfiguration and dynamic composition [44].
As a summary of the subsection, we leave the reader with a summary as
illustrated in Table 1.1. This Table maps protective measures to the adaptive
security life cycle.
Table 1.1: Mapping protective measures to the adaptive security life cycle.
Security Adaptive Security Life Cycle Stages








1.4 Motivation and Research Problem
Undoubtedly, the growing rate of security incidents and cost show that current
security solutions cannot stop the sophistication and complexity of attacks [18]
[37]. This is evident by the fact that virus scan programs always need to be
updated. Widely used devices can be a source of complex and sophisticated
attacks. For example, mobile devices can be used as an attack source, an attack
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target or part of an attack [45]. Furthermore, there is a vicious cycle between
attackers and defenders, which is evident by the fact that virus scan programs
always need to be current. This security phobia is the drive behind the efforts put
forwards by academics and researchers to deal with security attacks to achieve
more secure environments, and indirectly reduce big losses resulting from such
attacks [46] [1] [38] [39].
Traditional security solutions are detection-oriented and rely on information
coming from the attacker. Traditional prevention and detection methodologies,
like deploying antivirus software, IDS/IPS and firewalls, have become less effec-
tive. These detection systems rely on history to catch attacks, but the more
history an organization has enabled, the more performance degradation. Further-
more, detection systems are seen as offering a temporary solution [19] because we
cannot defend against all attacks. That is, if a new attack comes, history-matching
will fail and behavior monitoring success will depend on how close the new at-
tack’s behavior is to the old attacks’ behavior. As a result, the giant Symantec
Corporation has announced that anti-virus is dead [19].
In order to stay ahead of attacks, organizations must keep away from predictive
and reactive approaches. Attack-based taxonomies classify existing attacks to
inform us of possible attacks one can expect. On the other hand, defense-based
taxonomies determine suitable defense solutions for specific attacks. What is
needed is a passive and proactive approach that provides protection against known
and unknown attacks without the need for constant patches.
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In attack-centric taxonomies, the analysis is done based on the attacker per-
spective. For instance, those taxonomies use the attack vector which considers
the goal of the attack. If the attacker targets file integrity, which is not achieved
but the attacker managed to harm the availability of the system, this is not con-
sidered from the attacker point of view [18]. To countermeasure such an attack, a
defender does not really know which security requirements nor which assets were
the target of the attacker.
All of the above motivated us to study security from an asset perspective
resulting in defense mechanisms with the following characteristics (a) asset owner
view point, (b) proactive approach, and (c) defending assets.
Furthermore, an asset-based approach will clearly draw the boundaries be-
tween the various security spaces. As it is, security is spread across a spectrum
of security prefixes coining security terms that include “physical security”, “infor-
mation security”, “data security”, “cyber security”, and other additional terms of
security. Currently, there are various definitions and interpretations to these terms
that are either used interchangeably, overlapping, conflicting, or vague. Cyber se-
curity is defined in [40] as “Measures taken to protect a computer or computer sys-
tem (as on the Internet) against unauthorized access or attack”, while information
security is defined in [29] [40] as “The protection of information and information
systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability”. These
two definitions are similar and as a result authors use information security and cy-
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ber security interchangeably. Cyber security is defined in [41] as “The protection
of cyberspace itself, the electronic information, the information communication
technology (ICT) that support cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their
personal, societal and national capacity, including any of their interests, either
tangible or intangible, that are vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace”.
Furthermore, terms such as “data security” and “information security” are used
almost interchangeably. Data security is defined in [29] [40] as “Protection of data
from unauthorized (accidental or intentional) modification, destruction, or disclo-
sure”. This definition is very similar to information security making the whole
security spectrum vague in definition with no clear boundaries.
In this thesis, we argue that the failure of current security solutions is the result
of the attacker leading the security game. Defenders are followers and defense
systems are built by defenders based on solicited input from the attacker. After
the defender collects the input and builds its defense system, the attacker changes
its attack vector and new defense system needs to be rebuilt and the vicious cycle
continues. As such, current security solutions have several drawbacks: (a) provide
solutions incapable of detecting unknown attacks, and (b) provide solutions that
use predictive or reactive strategies.
This thesis proposes to change the security game such that the game will be
led by defenders. This is the natural way to play such a game because the defender
knows exactly its assets, knows exactly its security requirements, and what are
the consequences of violating these security requirements. Therefore, the defender
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can build a defense system based on information it owns not solicited nor given
by the attacker.
1.5 Thesis Objectives
The goal of this thesis is to design and implement an asset-based security system.
Specific thesis objectives are:
1. To study and classify the current security systems.
2. To study the relationship between critical assets, security requirements and
security spaces.
3. To investigate and identify the strength and weakness of existing security
taxonomies.
4. To design a taxonomy based on defending assets rather than defending
against attacks.
5. To design and implement an asset-based security system.
1.6 Thesis Contributions
Our proposed security system has the following characteristics (a) relies only on
information from the defender, (b) defending assets rather than defending against
attacks, (c) proactive and (d) passive. The proposed security system relies on
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information supplied by the assets’ owner. Therefore, our system discovers at-
tacks based on information solicited by the defender. As such, the monitoring
is not done to discover nor prevent attacks based on attack vectors nor attack
behaviors. Since the proposed approach defends assets, it is generic and is not
tailored to a set of attacks. Furthermore, the proposed approach is proactive that
involves anticipating violations in advance of their actual occurrence and making
appropriate organizational shifts in its response. Finally, our approach is passive
since it works at the hypervisor-level. More importantly, it is transparent to the
guest operating systems making it difficult for running processes to detect if they
are being monitored.
We envision that our proposed asset-based approach will have the following
contributions:
1. Draws clear boundaries between the various security spaces.
2. Enables asset defense solutions.
3. Enables proactive defense solutions.
4. Enables passive defense solutions.
1.7 Thesis Organization
There is no doubt that security issues are on the rise and defense mechanisms
are becoming one of the leading subjects for academic and industry experts. In
this thesis, we focus on the security domain and suggest a new way of looking at
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the security life cycle. We also discuss the problem statement and our motivation
to solve the problem. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. For
clarity and completeness purposes, chapter 2 outlines the existing definitions of
various security spaces as well as security requirements. The literature review is
outlined in chapter 3. In chapter 3, we survey the existing security requirements
taxonomies, security attack taxonomies as well as security defense taxonomies.
Chapters 2 and 3 lay down the ground for the proposed work in this thesis. We
propose an asset-based taxonomy in chapter 4 and a methodology to achieve our
goals of this thesis. Chapter 5 presents the proposed asset-based security model,
while chapter 6 describes the evaluation environment needed to do the perfor-
mance evaluation, and chapter 7 outlines in details the performance evaluations.




In any security domain there exists assets, security requirements, attackers and
defenders. Attackers exploit vulnerabilities and target one or more security re-
quirements of one or more assets. These attacks are mitigated by safeguards and
defenses [47]. We start this chapter by defining threats, vulnerabilities, and assets.
We follow up with few sub-sections looking at the various security spaces, security
requirements. We also link security requirements to security spaces. We conclude
this chapter by drawing our observations and remarks.
2.1 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Assets
External or internal malicious actions usually target a quality or state that is ex-
posed. The nature of being exposed renders a system state to be defendless. Ma-
licious actions’ goal is to harm assets and this is achieved by penetrating through
system weaknesses. In this section we shed some light on these three important
components of any security system, namely targets or assets, aggressive actions
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or threats against the target, and weaknesses or vulnerabilities.
Assets are defined in [42] as “A system resource that is (a) required to be pro-
tected by an information system's security policy, (b) intended to be protected
by a countermeasure, or (c) required for a system’s mission”. In the content
of information security, computer security and network security, an asset is de-
fined as “any data, device, or other component of the environment that supports
information-related activities. Assets generally include hardware (e.g. servers and
switches), software (e.g. mission critical applications and support systems) and
confidential information” [48]. Assets should be protected from illicit access, use,
disclosure, alteration, destruction, and/or theft, resulting in loss to the organi-
zation. Therefore, assets are necessary for systems to achieve their functionality
and there must be a security system to protect these assets.
Vulnerabilities on the other hand, are defined as “the intersection of a system
susceptibility or flaw, attacker access to the flaw, and attacker capability to exploit
the flaw” [48]. To exploit a vulnerability, an attacker must use applicable tool or
technique that can utilize a system weakness. Therefore, vulnerabilities are also
known as the attack surface. In [42] authors define vulnerability as “A flaw or
weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management
that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy”. The vulnerability
in a system can be in design, specification, in implementation, or in operation and
management [42].
Finally, threats are defined as “any circumstance or event with the potential to
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adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, image,
or reputation), organizational assets, or individuals through an information sys-
tem via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information,
and/or denial of service. Also, the potential for a threat-source to successfully
exploit a particular information system vulnerability” [49].
2.2 Security Spaces
2.2.1 Physical Security Space
One of the most essential and prominent security spaces is physical security space.
Physical security is defined in [50] as “The protection of personnel, hardware, pro-
grams, networks, and data from physical circumstances and events that could
cause serious losses or damage to an enterprise, agency, or institution. This
includes protection from fire, natural disasters, burglary, theft, vandalism, and
terrorism”. Also, physical security is defined in [51] as “The protection afforded
to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives
of preserving the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information system
resources (includes hardware, software, firmware, information, data, and telecom-
munications)”. Another definition of physical security [52] is “That part of secu-
rity concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent
unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to
safeguard against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft”.
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From these definitions, we notice that despite what is the target, if there is
a physical contact then the whole attack fits in the physical security space. An
example is given in [32] where a program called “Private Eye” was designed to
handle eavesdroppers and physical security threats by applying screen protection
to identify legitimate users. If the user is not identified, then the monitor gets
blurry to protect data and the intruder photo is captured. Other examples repre-
senting physical attacks [51] are the cases of losing laptops and the other physical
devices.
Table 2.1 shows the threats, vulnerabilities, and assets involved in the phys-
ical space. Threats are various and can be cutting network cables or stealing a
laptop. Vulnerabilities must be physical. Examples of such vulnerabilities are
malfunctioning monitoring system or bypassing security guards. Finally, the goal
of a physical attack is to target a physical entity that can be a human, building,
or a device.
Table 2.1: Physical security space.
Security Component
space Threats Vulnerabilities Assets
Physical Various Physical circumstances Physical entity
2.2.2 Information and Communication Technology Security
Space
Before defining information and communication technology security space, we
have to differentiate between information and information technology. In [53] in-
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formation is defined as “information can take on many forms. It can be printed or
written on paper, stored electronically, transmitted by post or electronic means,
shown on films, conveyed in conversation, and so forth”. It seems that there
are two parts of information namely, electronic and non-electronic. We will re-
fer to electronic information as e-information, and t-information to refer to non-
electronic information or traditional information.
E-information must be stored, transmitted, and processed by technology, this
is called information communication technology (e-ICT) as defined in [53]. On
the other hand, storing or transmitting t-information, traditional technology or
non-electronic technology must be used, which will refer to as t-information com-
munication technology (t-ICT). So whenever we use ICT security space we mean
the space in general and when we need to distinguish between them we will use
either e-ICT or t-ICT.
ICT is defined as “all aspects relating to defining, achieving and maintaining
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, authen-
ticity, and reliability of information resources” [53]. It should be noted that the
protection of information can be extended to the underlying information resources
which is ICT, and that information security depends mostly on ICT security. An
example of ICT security space attack is given in [9] [20], when a virus sabotaged
30,000 workstations and destroyed hard disks. Another example of ICT security
space attack is when an attacker gains access to a system because of insufficient
authentication, insufficient validation, or insufficient password strength. The at-
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tacker here can take control of the system or initiate another attack vector.
Table 2.2 shows both e-ICT and t-ICT security spaces and draws the difference
between these two security spaces using threats, vulnerabilities and assets. Assets
are the targets need to be protected from various threats exploiting vulnerabilities.
Table 2.2: ICT security space.
Security Component
space Threats Vulnerabilities Assets
t-ICT Various t-ICT t-ICT
e-ICT Various e-ICT e-ICT
2.2.3 Information Security Space
Information is composed of two parts e-information and t-information with their
own vulnerabilities. E-information vulnerability come from e-ICT, and similarly
t-information vulnerability comes from t-ICT. Table 2.3 shows the threats, vul-
nerabilities, and assets of the information security space.
Table 2.3: Information security space.
Security Component
space Threats Vulnerabilities Assets
Information Various t-ICT, e-ICT Information
Information security space is ensuring safety and protection of information
from illegal access. Authors in [53] defined information security as “the protection
of information and its critical elements, including the systems and hardware that
use, store, and transmit that information”. It is obvious that systems and infras-
tructures play an important role in the information security process. According
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to [8], May 13th 2011 is the date of the 2nd largest online data breach in the
US. This breach is an information security space attack where attackers exploited
computer systems through vulnerabilities such as misconfiguration, kernel flaws,
design flaws or buffer overflow [8] [54] [55].
2.2.4 Cyber Security Space
As we mentioned previously users misuse the term of cyber security and use it
interchangeably with information security. In [53] cyber security is defined as “the
protection of cyberspace itself, the electronic information, the ICTs that support
cyberspace, and the users of cyberspace in their personal, societal and national
capacity, including any of their interests, either tangible or intangible, that are
vulnerable to attacks originating in cyberspace”. Another definition of cyber se-
curityis stated in [56] as “prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration
of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communication ser-
vices, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information
contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidential-
ity, and nonrepudiation”.
Examples of cyber security attacks [8] include hacking Dropbox facility in
July 2012. Usernames and passwords were stolen and used to access the Dropbox
accounts. As a result, attackers start bullying Dropbox users causing what is
known as cyber terrorism, cybercrime, or cyber espionage [57]. Cyber security
space is considered a complex space because it intersects with many other security
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spaces such as ICT and information. Table 2.4 shows components of a cyber
security attack.
Table 2.4: Cyber security space.
Security Component
space Threats Vulnerabilities Assets
Cyber Various e-information, e-ICT Human
After we clarify the boundaries of the different security spaces, we can see
that penetrating the physical security space can lead to all other security spaces
enabling the attacker to skip some countermeasures in other security spaces. The
attacker later can start a new attack vector in new security space. As such, the
first step always comes from physical or ICT security spaces.
In Table 2.5, we summarize the security spaces. From the Table, assets and
their vulnerabilities must be considered in order to fit an attack to a security space.
Assets alone or vulnerabilities alone cannot correctly classify attacks according to
their security space. This shows us that classifying attacks from defenders point-
view is impossible since vulnerabilities are not known to defenders. As such,
defense systems are seriously hindered by the lack of information about attacks
[58]. This also shows us the importance of assets in mitigating attacks.
Table 2.5: Security spaces.
Space Threats Vulnerabilities Assets
Physical Security Various Physical circumstances Physical entity
e-ICT Security Various e-ICT e-ICT
t-ICT Security Various t-ICT t-ICT
Information Security Various e-ICT, t-ICT Information
Cyber Security Various e-ICT, e-information Humans
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2.3 Security Requirements
Security policies and priorities have become complicated, often ambiguous, and
even inconsistent; not because of immediate threats but rather the unpredictable,
uncertain, and blurring requirements of the security arena [59]. Furthermore, it
is becoming an intricate puzzle for security engineers and architects to develop
meaningful and realistic secure environments. Many taxonomies are introduced
to deal with a single attack, and most of them fail to handle blended attacks [60].
A taxonomy proposed [54], known as AVOIDIT, managed to classify blended
attacks. In [59], a holistic security requirement taxonomy was proposed were
authors surveyed many security requirement papers and classified them in basic
categories.
2.3.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is defined in information security as “is the property, that infor-
mation is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities,
or processes”. [61]. Confidentiality might seem similar to “privacy” but in fact
the two terms are different. Rather, confidentially is a component of privacy that
implements to protect our data from unauthorized viewers. Examples of confiden-
tiality of electronic data being compromised include laptop theft, password theft,
or sensitive emails being sent to the incorrect individuals [62].
Therefore, confidentiality is basically a set of rules that limits access to infor-
mation. Formally, [63] defines confidentiality as “the prevention of unauthorized
25
disclosure of information”. Another definition is given in [64] “the assurance that
information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes or device”.
2.3.2 Integrity
Integrity is defined in [63] as “the prevention of unauthorized modification of
information”. In [64], authors define integrity as “the quality of an information
system reflecting logical correctness and reliability of an operating system; the
logical completeness of the hardware and software implementing the protection
mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures and occurrence of the
stored data”. Another definition of integrity [65] states “quality of an information
system reflecting the logical correctness and reliability of the operating system, the
logical completeness of the hardware and software implementing the protection
mechanisms, and the consistency of the data structures and occurrence of the
stored data”. Yet another definition to data integrity is “the state that exists when
computerized data is the same as that in the source documents and has not been
exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction. The property that
data has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction”
[65].
2.3.3 Availability
Availability means expecting to find the entity when the user needs it. In [42], it
is defined as “the property of a system or a system resource being accessible, or
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usable or operational upon demand, by an authorized system entity, according to
performance specifications for the system; i.e., a system is available if it provides
services according to the system design whenever users request them, sure this
property is a different than reliability”. Another definition of availability is given
in [63] is “the prevention of unauthorized withholding of information”. Yet another
definition to availability [64] is “the timely, reliable access to data and information
services for authorized user”.
2.3.4 Access Control
Access control is a vital step in forcing security. In [42], it is defined as “pro-
tection of system resources against unauthorized access”. The same paper gave
another definition to access control as “a process by which use of system resources
is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized
entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy”.
A third definition provided in [59] as “limitations on interactions between subjects
and objects in an information system”. Authors in [59] divided access control into
identification, authentication, and authorization.
Other researchers [42] define authentication as composing of two steps namely
identification and verification. Authentication is defined as “the process of ver-
ifying a claim that a system entity or system resource has a certain attribute
value” [42]. Another definition [64] to authentication is “security service designed
to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of
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verifying an individual's authorizations to receive specific categories of informa-
tion”.
Identification means to recognize a user by the system. In [42], identification
is defined as “an act or process that presents an identifier to a system so that the
system can recognize a system entity and distinguish it from other entities”.
Verification as stated in [42] as “the process of examining information to es-
tablish the truth of a claimed fact or value”. Also in [42], verification is defined
as “the process of comparing two levels of system specification for proper corre-
spondence, such as comparing a security model with a top-level specification, a
top-level specification with source code, or source code with object code”. As
such, verification is presenting authentication information that acts as evidence.
This evidence proves the binding between the attribute and that for which it is
claimed. Authorization is giving permission or privilege to users after being au-
thenticated. Basically, authorization is an approval granted to an entity to access
resource.
2.3.5 Non-Repudiation
In [42], non-repudiation is defined as “a security service that provide protection
against false denial of involvement in an association (especially a communication
association that transfers data)”. For example, two separate types of denial are
possible. An entity can deny that it sent a data object, or it can deny that it
received a data object. Therefore, two separate types of non-repudiation service
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are possible. Non-repudiation is also defined in [64] as “the assurance the sender
of the data is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is provided with
proof of the sender's identity, so neither can later deny having processed the data”.
Other researchers [66] define non-repudiation as “prevention of attacks done by
one of the two parties in the communication, the sender or the receiver, one of
them later may deny that he has sent or received the message. Like when a bank
customer asking his bank to send some money to a third party but later denying
he has made such request”.
2.3.6 Accountability
Accountability means the responsibility of one’s actions. Formally [65] defines ac-
countability as “assignment of a document control number, including copy number,
which is used to establish individual responsibility for the document and permits
traceability and disposition of the document”. Accountability is also defined in
[42] as “the property of a system or system resource that ensures that the actions
of system entity may be traced uniquely to that entity, which can then be held
responsible for its actions”. Therefore, to offer accountability, a system should
positively associate users’ identities with the method and time access. That way,
detection and subsequent security investigation can be done. Users are held ac-
countable for their actions after being notified of their behavior for abusing the
system. Proper consequences should be associated (with such abuse) and enforced.
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2.3.7 Anonymity
The term “anonymous message” typically means the sender and/or the receiver
of the message are not revealed. In many countries, anonymous messages are
protected by law and must be delivered as regular messages. Being unknown is
the goal when achieving anonymity. Anonymity is defined in [42] as “the condition
of an identity being unknown or concealed”. To achieve this definition and to
maintain the service at the same time, a third party must hide user information.
2.4 Security Spaces and Requirements
This section studies the relationships between the security requirements and the
security spaces. Table 2.6 answers the following question: In which security spaces
a certain security requirement is achievable. The answer to this question tells us
which security spaces we should consider to provide a holistic security solution.
For example, if our security system needs to provide a holistic availability solution
for a certain asset, in which security spaces should availability be provided. In
Table 2.6, if the security requirement is achievable in the corresponding security
space, the table entry is marked Y. Otherwise, the table entry is marked N.
To elaborate on Table 2.6, we provide an explanation for each row in the table
by picking each security requirement and illustrate its mapping to the different
security spaces.
Access Control: In the physical security space, access control security re-
quirement is achievable by physical barriers such as doors, walls, or security gates.
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Table 2.6: Mapping security requirements to security spaces.
Spaces
Security Physical Information e-ICT t-ICT sec
requirements security security security security
Access Control Y Y Y Y
Availability Y Y Y Y
Integrity N Y Y Y
Confidentiality N Y N N
Anonymity N Y N N
Non-Repudiation N N Y Y
Accountability N N Y Y
In [67], security gates are used to achieve physical access control. Furthermore,
in the information security space, passwords are used on the file level (i.e., in-
formation level) and this will achieve information access control as done in [68].
Users can also easily set passwords on their web pages and these web pages are
considered files. Considering e-ICT security space, access control can be achieved
on different e-ICT resources such as wireless networks, PCs, and Servers. Again,
this e-ICT access control can be achieved simply through using passwords. In
[69], e-ICT access control is applied to computers or networks. Finally, t-ICT
controls access to information using traditional techniques such as single-factor
authentication by using secure keywords.
Availability: Availability in physical security space is applicable. To achieve
availability in physical space, we can apply a solution to insure physical availability
for physical entities such as network cables for instance. In [67], video surveillance
systems are introduced to maintain availability. This can be considered as a
combination of both e-ICT and physical security spaces. Physical security guards,
instead of cameras, can be used to achieve availability at the physical security
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space. We can also achieve availability by performing backups and redundancy
as done in [70]. In [70], authors introduced high availability systems for steam
processing. Top companies also provide products such as “IBM DB2 HADR” (High
Availability Disaster Recovery), “Oracle Data Guard” and “Microsoft SQL Server
2005 Database Mirroring”. Replication is also used to achieve availability as in
[71] where HADOOP is introduced to achieve high availability through metadata
replication. E-ICT availability solutions can be achieved by: (a) producing reliable
e-ICT to persist attacks and maintain availability, (b) having reliable servers, or
(c) constructing reliable networks immune to disturbances from attacks [72]. For
t-ICT security space, availability is achievable by manufacturing and designing
technology which can maintain availability for stored information. This technology
can be, for example, producing papers which can survive and maintain information
for long periods of time.
Integrity: Integrity is achievable in information, e-ICT, and t-ICT security
spaces, but not in physical security spaces. In information security space, we can
have this by creating backups on information level [70], hashing algorithms as done
in [73] [74] such as MD5, HMAC, or SHA1 to calculate hashes to verify integrity.
For e-ICT security space, integrity can be achieved by fault tolerance algorithms
either hardware or software [75]. An approach was introduced in [75] to tolerate
various malicious code modifications and transient-faults during run time of a
computing application system. Furthermore a security solution for data integrity
in wireless bio sensor networks was introduced in [76]. For t-ICT security space,
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handwriting analysis and recognition techniques can be used to achieve integrity.
Confidentiality: There is no solution to apply confidentiality at the e-ICT,
nor the t-ICT, nor the physical security spaces. Confidentiality is achievable in the
information security space and techniques such as steganography and encryption
can be used to achieve confidentiality at the information security space. Steganog-
raphy as mentioned in [77] is used to conceal the fact that a secret is sent inside
a message. Traditional methods like using invisible ink in communication [66]
is another way to achieve confidentiality. Finally, encryption also can achieve
confidentiality by protecting message contents.
Anonymity: To have a holistic anonymity security requirement solution, we
can have it on information security space in [78] they propose an anonymous
routing protocol to wireless network, this is similar to onion routing concept used
in wired networks, also VPN can have solution to anonymity security requirement.
Another solution is to have third party for exchanging information [66], aliasing
also can achieve this solution by using identified number instead of name, like
in [42] a financial institution may assign account numbers, so transactions can
remain relatively anonymous with the transactions accepted as legitimate. There
is no solution to apply anonymity security requirement at the e-ICT, t-ICT, and
physical security spaces.
Non-Repudiation: to have information non-repudiation security solution in
t-ICT security space registered mail used as solution [79], this technology evolved
to become digital signature in e-ICT security space, experts found that even digital
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signature is not enough so they invent capturing unique biometric information and
other data about the sender [79], another solution as in [80] they introduce a fair
non-repudiation protocol that requires a trusted third party. There is no solution
to apply non-repudiation security requirement at the information security space
nor at physical security space.
Accountability: to have a holistic accountability security requirement so-
lution in e-ICT security space, specifying transactions for which you want more
than one approval, and authorize different levels of account access as in [81] they
achieve accountability in their online business, for t-ICT security space, it can be
done by feeding users with different contradicting information to reveal the spoke
man. There is no solution to apply accountability security requirement at the
physical security space nor at information security space.
2.5 Security Requirements Classification
Now, let us classify the security requirements based on attack type and attack
target as shown in Table 2.7. Authors in [66] classified attack types to either
active or passive. They described an active attack as an attack that may change
the data or harm the system as such attacks threatening integrity or availability
as active attacks. They also mentioned that in passive attacks, the attacker’s goal
is just to obtain information and therefore, the attacker does not modify data
or harm the system. The system continues its normal operation. However, the
attack may harm the sender or the receiver.
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From this classification done by [66], we added the attack target. For example,
if the assets are the target, then the attackers need to use the assets to achieve
their goal. That is, active attacks such as “Availability” target assets as we say that
this is an attack on the availability of an asset. On the other hand, passive attacks
such as “Anonymity” target either the sender or the receiver and not the asset. For
example, “anonymity” is applied to either the sender or the receiver. Unlinkability
of sender and receiver also is a way of implementing “Anonymity” which means
that though the sender and receiver can each be identified as participating in some
communication, they cannot be identified as communicating with each other.
Table 2.7: Classification of security requirements.
Security Attack Attributes
requirements Type Target







2.6 Observations and Remarks
Damage can be done by either internal or external events and these events are ba-
sically threats. Threats exploit weakness to perform unauthorized actions within
a system. Threats target to damage assets and the damage intensity is correlated
with how critical is the asset. These three components (threats, vulnerabilities,
assets) are played by different actors in different security spaces as explained in
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this chapter. Observing this, we can draw the following remarks:
• To classify attacks, one needs to consider assets and vulnerabilities. This
consideration is impossible since vulnerabilities are not known to the de-
fender. Therefore, defenders always have incomplete information to estab-
lish a defense system.
• For threats and vulnerabilities, attackers have the upper hand since they
themselves decide on the attack vector and on the vulnerability to gain
access to the system in order to deliver a malicious outcome (i.e., damaging
the asset).
• The goal of the attack is to inflict harm or compromise the security require-
ments of the targeted asset. As such, the attacker needs to learn the critical
assets. But since the defender owns these assets, the defender controls this
learning phase. That is why zero-day ransomware attacks encrypt all files
hoping that a subset of these encrypted files are important for the owner.
If zero-day ransomware attacks know the critical files, they will not waste
time and effort on other non-critical files.
• Focusing on assets will prevent an attacker from achieving the attack goal.
This is evident from Table 2.7. Protecting assets will render attacks useless
since this will prevent all attacks violating the CIA triad of confidentiality,




Researches started introducing requirements-based taxonomies [82] [83] [84] [64]
[85] [63] [86] [87] [88] [60] [59] to gain knowledge of the needs to achieve secure
systems and continued to understand and analyze the existing attacks [89] [58]
[55] [54] [90] [91] to gain knowledge of the behavior and the damage caused by
such attacks. Finally, researchers shifted to defense-based taxonomies [58] [92]
[91] [93] [94] [95] [18] to countermeasure a specific attack with an effective defense
mechanism.
The attack-based taxonomies are widely researched whereas the defense-based
taxonomies are hindered by several serious facts [58], lack of detailed information
about attack information, lack of benchmarks, and difficulty of large-scale testing
in defense systems [58].
In a nutshell, attack-based taxonomies illustrate the process of classifying at-
tacks and enables administrators to gain common security knowledge to become
alert in defending when attacks are detected [54]. On the other hand, defense-
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based taxonomies help in determining the suitable defense mechanism.
3.1 Existing Security Taxonomies
3.1.1 Requirements-Based Taxonomy
One of the well-known requirements-based taxonomies is mentioned in [82] [83] and
is referred to as Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) triad model. CIA is
referred to as at the heart of information security. Later, other taxonomies added
more security requirements to CIA, arguing that CIA is not sufficient.
In [84], authors reintroduced a model known as “Parkerian hexad” which was
introduced in 2002 by Donn B. Parker. This model is a set of 6 information
security requirements. Adding possession, authenticity and utility to the CIA
triad model.
In [85], authors introduced Access Control, Authentication, and Accounting
(AAA) triad model. AAA is the cornerstone of any systematic discipline of se-
curity [85]. Other researchers in [96] [97] introduced security requirements for
software systems representing the basic security policy needed in order to protect
software system. It has 8 security requirements namely, fair exchange, freshness,
secure information flow, guarded access, role base access control, authenticity,
secrecy and integrity, and non-repudiation [96] [97].
A detailed quality model for safety, security, and survivability engineering
was introduced in [86]. This model describes relationships between concepts that
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contribute to systemic qualities and decomposed some of the security requirements
such as access control to (identification, authentication, authorization), integrity
to (data integrity, hardware integrity, personnel integrity, software integrity), and
privacy to (anonymity, confidentiality).
An Accelerated Requirements Method (ARM) [87] groups security require-
ments and utilizes a structured categorization technique to group and name secu-
rity requirements. In this paper, authors defined six groups, each contains one to
four security requirements. namely they are confidentiality, access control, data
integrity, manageability, usability, and authentication.
A taxonomy of software security requirements [88] proposed two levels of secu-
rity requirements. The first level includes integrity, availability, confidentiality and
non-repudiation. The second level redefines each of the first level security require-
ments into more specific terms. For example, availability is refined as (response
time requirements, expiration requirements, and resource allocation requirements)
[88].
A taxonomy proposed in [60] classifying security requirements as confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, accountability, and conformance. Each of these require-
ments branches into sub-categories [60]. A holistic taxonomy of security require-
ments proposed in [59]. Authors examined similarities and differences between
all previously published security requirements classifying them all into two levels,
namely basic and cofactor levels. In this paper, security requirements were classi-
fied into 13 basic requirements. Each one of these basic 13 security requirements
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has from 1 to 8 cofactors. For example, privacy is one of the basic requirements
and it has 8 cofactors listed as trace, cardinality, content and notification, attri-
bution, aggregation, encryption, confidentiality and anonymity [59].
3.1.2 Attack-Based Taxonomy
Continuing the efforts of classifying and defining security requirements, research
efforts are also channeled towards classifying and understanding attacks. Re-
searchers in [89] provided an incident taxonomy based on the attack classification
by events. These attacks are analyzed to have the following steps: target, vulner-
ability, action, tools and unauthorized result. These steps basically determine the
attacks directed at a specific target of the attacker. In order for the attacker to
reach the target, a specific vulnerability must be utilized resulting in a changed
state. This gives a whole picture of all the steps involved in an attack and how
an attack grows [89].
A comprehensive taxonomy of attacks targeting availability was introduced
in [58]. The aim was to classify attack strategies and list attributes of attack
strategies that are essential in developing countermeasures classified by possibility
of characterization, attack rate dynamics, degree of automation, source address
validity, exploited weakness, victim type, persistent agent set, and impact on
victim. A list of attacks were mapped to specific countermeasure and security
requirement [55].
A group of academics at Memphis University [54] introduced “AVOIDIT”, a
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cyber-attack taxonomy describing the nature of an attack using 5 major classi-
fication: attack vector, defense, operational impact, informational impact, and
attack target. Classification by the defense mechanism to provide information
to the system administrator concerning attack remediation or mitigation poli-
cies. Mitigation includes action such as removing from network, whitelisting, or
referencing advertisements. Remediation includes system patching and code cor-
rection. Attack targets might be the OS, the network, a process, or data. This
taxonomy lacks defense strategies and cannot deal with physical attacks such as
the ones initiated by USB drives [54]. AVOIDIT is able to efficiently categorize
mixed attacks.
According to [90], an extensive taxonomy for computer network attacks was
explored. This taxonomy introduced 4 hierarchical levels and succeeded to in-
clude attackers and defenders. A taxonomy for security threats in emergency
management was discussed in [91]. Authors classified attacks by three types:
network type, function affected, and attack factor. They examined SMS flooding
attacks cellular network, public safety mobile network issue, GPS spoofing attacks
in satellite systems, and cyber threats in wired networks. Authors also examined
five affected functions, which are: detection of emergencies, planning of operation,
transportation, medical service and communication with the public. From the at-
tack vector point of view, authors examined at network misuse (vulnerability of
nodes, masquerading, flooding), and software misuse (executed remotely and lo-
cally). In [98], researchers introduced attack countermeasures used for security
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analysis. These attack countermeasures become a vital factor when analyzing the
system from the security perspective.
3.1.3 Defense-Based Taxonomy
In [58], a defense taxonomy of mechanisms for Distributed Denial of Services
(DDoS) was introduced. Three attributes were taken into consideration to classify
defense strategies. These attributes are cooperation degree (autonomous, cooper-
ative or interdependent), activity level (preventive or reactive), and deployment
location (victim network, intermediate network or source network).
A defense-centric taxonomy was introduced by [92]. This taxonomy is based
on attack manifestations. The manifestations depend on comprising sequences of
system calls. This sequence is generated from the activity or presence of an attack.
Four classes were introduced in the taxonomy: manifestation by foreign symbol,
manifestation by minimal foreign sequence, manifestation by dormant sequences
and manifestation by being anomalous [92].
A security threats taxonomy was introduced in [91]. This classification con-
tains three categories: defense type, degree of distribution and organizational
element. Organizational element is further branched to system, process and hu-
man, while by defense type is divided to preventive (authentication, resilience and
self-awareness) and reactive (detection and response).
A reliable defense framework was proposed in [93]. In this framework, authors
used countermeasures as well as attacks to recommend an efficient and reliable
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defense mechanism. Authors assess multi-step attack damages to identify corre-
sponding defense countermeasures in order to mitigate service downtime.
Exploring intrusion detection systems to reduce infiltration done by attackers
[94], researchers introduced a taxonomy for intrusion response system and intru-
sion detection system classifying defenses by: response cost, level of automation,
response time, adjustment ability. The same group of researchers [95] introduced
a security risk assessment taxonomy adding to their previous work risk assessment
as a defense classification attribute.
Authors in [18] explored a defense-centric attack metric, neglecting the effect
of ambiguous vulnerability and uncovered attacks, to evaluate the damage done
to critical assets by ranking intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts in an auto-
matic manner. This evaluation process depends on a graph connecting assets to
consequences for each of the system requirements.
3.2 Recent Development
3.2.1 Zero-Day Attacks
Authors in [99] employ several data mining techniques to detect and classify zero-
day malware based on the frequency of windows API calls using supervised learn-
ing algorithms. Various classifiers were trained through analyzing the behavior of
large database with and without malicious codes. This system depends mostly on
features extracted from previous attacks.
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A behavior-based scheme was proposed in [100] to spot zero-day android mal-
ware. Before releasing android applications into the public domain, the work done
in [100] automatically monitors dangerous behaviors of such applications to warn
the users of zero-day attacks such as launching roots exploit or sending background
SMS messages.
In [101], a machine learning framework is proposed to detect known and newly
emerging network attacks using layer three and four data flow characteristics. The
framework depends on a supervised classification in detecting known classes and
adapts the unsupervised learning phase to detect new classes.
A survey to classify zero-day polymorphic worm detection techniques is done
in [35]. Detection techniques survey three signatures detection techniques, namely
content-based, semantic-based, and vulnerability-driven. In addition to the sig-
natures detection techniques, authors use statistical-based and behavior-based
detection techniques.
Researchers in [102] introduce a metric to rank safety from zero-day attacks by
counting how many such vulnerabilities would be required before compromising
network assets. The algorithm used assumes insider attackers and gives the same
weight to all zero-day vulnerabilities.
3.2.2 Ransomware Attacks
The recent zero-day ransomware attacks also earned the attention of the research
arena. Authors in [103] introduced R-Locker to countermeasure zero-day ran-
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somware attacks. A honeyfile is created and acts as a trap to elude and minimize
the damage done to real assets. Various links are added to the honeyfile to divert
the malware and learn its tools, tactics, and motives. Countermeasures will then
be initiated to eradicate the damage, if any, done by the ransomware.
The zero-day ransomware anomaly detection approach introduced in [104] was
highlighted by [105] where I/O operations are analyzed and a sequence of I/O
requests is obtained. If the obtained sequence matches a known ransomware
sequence, then an alarm is raised. A known ransomware sequence looks like (a)
read the file, (b) encrypt the file, and (c) replace the original data by the encrypted
data. The authors went even further and compared screen shots to detect screen
locker ransomware and also extracted some words from the screen shots to be
analyzed and examined.
A survey is conducted in [105] to pinpoint ransomware success factors. This
survey found that reasons behind the spreading of ransomware attacks and their
success are not the techniques used by the ransomware itself or unknown-nature
of zero-day ransomware attacks. Rather the available technology and applications
played a vital role in enabling the adversary to hide their payment transaction
with the ability to reach as many victims as possible in short time. Due to in-
efficiency and the static-nature of antivirus programs, authors in [106] developed
a behavior-based compromise system. This system detects data breach using
machine learning techniques by analyzing network traffic to identify zero-day ran-
somware. Authors targeted WannaCry ransomware in particular.
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Android ransomware attacks were the focus in [107]. A large-scale of 2,721
Android ransomware samples were collected and characterized to insure the ma-
jority of existing Android malware are covered and reflected in the sample. The
paper proposed RansomProber, a real-time behavoir-based ransomware detection
system. Evaluation experiments were conducted to compare the overall detection
accuracy analysis tools, anti-virus solutions, and RansomProber. RansomProber
outperformed two state-of-the-art malware analysis tools and a number of com-
mercial solutions with a detection accuracy of 99%.
In [107], authors focus in specific kind of ransomware which is related to An-
droid ransomware they collect 2,721 samples of them, they notice that existing
anti-virus are useless, so they propose RansomProber which is real-time detec-
tion system. They study and analyze the ransomware according to some feature
which are :(1) lock screen (2) encrypt file (3) permission uses (4) payment method
(5) threatening message. They focus on encrypting ransomware with assumption
that ransomware does not elevate privileges, also it is easy to defeat any real-
time protection system, and due to malware scanners can detect root exploits,
ransomware authors avoid retrieving root privileges which is easy to be done by
some root-kit tools. Finally, they assume that the early alarm can reduce the
number of encrypted file. RansomProber can detect if the users initiate the file
encryption operations by analyzing if there is encryption done to any file, then
they check whether the encryption is normal or abnormal operation by doing
foreground analysis, then they check user interface widgets which doesn’t exist in
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ransomware sample like: (1) file list to be encrypted which is selected and partial
in benign application while in ransomware case it is random and full (2) hint text
must shown when you deal with sensitive behavior as encryption, this hint text
doesn’t exist in ransomware case (3) button which enable the user to interact with
encryption process in benign application and it is not used in ransomware case.
From all mentioned RansomProber considered to be behavioral based. Ransom-
Prober shown to have high accuracy and acceptable runtime performance when
detecting encryption done by ransomware through experimental results.
3.2.3 Moving Target Defense
A group of academics [36] [108] introduce a moving target defense (MTD). The
MTD is the concept of morphing the target, making it unfamiliar to the attacker
[109] [110] [111] [112]. Therefore, the attacker is forced to learn the target repeat-
edly. Consequently, this will (a) reduce the attacker’s window of success and (b)
increase the costs of their probing and efforts of their attack.
Since declaring MTD, many researchers adopt it in so many fields in [111] MTD
to tuned to deal with stealthy botnets, MTD is needed due to information gained
by stealthy botnets by knowing the target network’s topology then discovering the
location of detectors and avoiding them by selecting path free detectors. An MTD
approach proposed in [111] with periodically changing the placement of detectors,
making it harder for attacker to compromise hosts and used it as proxies. Experi-
ments done to show that the new approach can effectively reduce the stealthiness
47
of botnets. by comparing traffic flow from MTD points containing data exfiltra-
tion by botnets with benign users to detect suspicious flows. Deploying MTD
costs the defender, some increase in overhead, this overhead can be controlled by
configuring MTD. For example the higher frequency of reconfiguration resulting
in increased cost with better security.
Another deployment of MTD comes in smart grids, when hidden MTD ap-
proach in [112] was proposed to avoid being detected by the attackers while main-
tain power flows of the grid.
Due to that passive defense approach usually let the attacker has more knowl-
edge about the defender a solution using MTD [109] placed in protecting a critical
resource in a network, so that the information asymmetry is reversed, by propos-
ing “Bayesian Stackelberg” to model this game between the leader who is the de-
fender and the follower who is the attacker. The defender adopts a MTD scheme
to thwart attacker strategy. The strategic attacker can watch the defender’s move-
ments and then act in a rational way. In addition to attacker and defender there
is a critical resource and a fully connected network. The two-player game begins
between defender and attacker with the attacker goal is to maximize its payoff
by reaching the resource, while the defender goal is to protect the resource with
minimal cost.
IT systems using clouds also has it share from MTD as in [110], by applying
MTD to cloud-Based IT knowing that MTD core idea is to make a proactive
defending system to eliminate the asymmetric advantage of attacker time. The
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challenge was to adapt MTD to as system with complexity and number of de-
pendencies within components in IT system without impacting the system per-





The realization of assets importance in security systems is gaining popularity. In
one of the largest cyber security summits and particularly during the European In-
formation Security Summit 2016 [113], Will Brandon, Chief Information Security
Officer (CISO) at the Bank of England, stressed on the identification of critical
processes and the understanding of assets. The CISO stated that organizations
should know their critical assets and critical processes. Furthermore, the CISO
stressed that organizations should have a way of understanding their assets and
score them against the financial impact, against the reputational and operational
impact [113] [114].
This chapter proposes an asset-based security system starting with a compar-
ison of security taxonomies in 4.1. Section 4.2 proposes an asset-based taxonomy
and finally section 4.5 outlines our proposed asset-based security system.
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4.1 Comparing Security Taxonomies
Table 4.1 differentiates between security taxonomies based on some attributes.
Attack-based taxonomies are generated from attackers view point. The strategy
behind building attack-based taxonomies is to predict the attack behavior in or-
der to detect the attack and become more familiar with it. As such, the goal
for attack-based security taxonomies is to classify attacks. Defense-based tax-
onomies are used to defend against attacks and therefore they react to attacks
in order to identify attacks and deal with them. The goal of defense-based tax-
onomies is to guide security practitioners of how to defend against specific attacks.
Requirements-based taxonomies are used by security experts as knowledge base.
They are established by security experts and their goal is to establish standards
and spread security knowledge. This knowledge is used by security experts to pro-
vide security solutions or to establish new security taxonomies. What is missing
is a security taxonomy that is built based on owner or stakeholder of the attack
target (i.e., the asset).
Our vision of an asset-based taxonomy is centered on the asset owner. A
security solution is established and its goal is to defend asset and not defend
against attacks. Therefore, the defense strategy is being proactive as opposed to
predict or wait and react.
51
Table 4.1: Comparison of security taxonomies.
Security View Point Strategy Goal
Taxonomy
Based On
Attacks Attacker Predictive Classify
Attacks
Defenses Defender Reactive Defend
Against
Attacks
Requirements Security None Knowledge
Expert Base
Assets Owner Proactive Defends
Assets
4.2 Asset-Based Taxonomy
Our proposed asset-based taxonomy builds a comprehensive organization system
for asset-based security solutions. After analyzing the assets in each system and
the security requirements for it, we will introduce a taxonomy depend on both,
this taxonomy can be viewed in Figure 4.1.
In this taxonomy the asset will be classified to categories, the asset will be
classified under each category by choice/s. This classification clarifies the asset
owner needs, later will be help in making the defense holistic and complete. the
categories are (1) Type of the asset which can be hardware containing valuable
containment, a t-information revealing secrets communicated or stored using tra-
ditional ways ,an e-information contained in a file or any electronic form [36],
human with their interests. (2) Security Space: the asset can be reached through
one of the spaces, or it may intersect with that space. For example if it is in
physical security space so countermeasures in that space should be looked for, it
is the same case when it is ICT, information or cyber security space. (3) Security
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Requirement: classify the asset regarding its security requirement which lead to
better secure environment and better performance, so the security requirement
can be one of the CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability), or one of the
other non CIA security requirement like anonymity, access control, accountability,
etc. (4) Rank of the asset: which can be primary asset which is the asset itself
or secondary asset which leads directly to the primary asset. (5) Target: the as-
set as target can be Stationary Target Defense (STD) or Moving Target Defense
(MTD). If the asset could be shifted to be MTD that would improve the security




















Figure 4.1: Asset-based taxonomy.
4.3 Methodology
The goal of our proposed security system, shown in Figure 4.2, is to develop de-
fense mechanisms based on complete information. Currently, defense mechanisms
are built based on incomplete information, which is dictated by attackers. In a
sense, we are changing the game from an attacker-led to a defender-led game.




























Figure 4.2: Security life cycle: (A) current cycle, (B) proposed cycle.
scanning files. The common way to do this is to use on-access scanning. When you
try to open a program, the antivirus software checks the program first, comparing
it to known viruses, worms, and other types of malware. The antivirus software
relies on virus definitions or signatures to achieve its goal.
What we are proposing here is an approach that reaches the same goal as
antivirus programs goal but not relying on a third-party information (i.e. third-
party virus definitions or signatures). As shown in Figure 4.2 (A), attacks are
classified based on attack vectors including attack type, exploited weakness, and
victim impact. These attack vectors are established by defenders to come up with
suitable defenses. As such, these defenses are defending against attacks. Figure
4.2 (B) uses an asset taxonomy to build an asset-based knowledge which contains
information owned by the asset owner as compared to the attack-based knowledge
containing information dictated by attackers.
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First, we start by identifying the assets and the security requirements needed
to protect the asset. For each of the security requirements, for example integrity,
we construct a graph as shown in Figure 4.3, where assets are represented as nodes.
These assets might be files, sockets, or processes. The flows between the nodes are
reflected in the creation or update of edges between nodes that model the respec-
tively involved nodes. All relevant communication directly or indirectly, imply a
data flow between two nodes. During the information identification phase, files F1
and F3 are identified as critical assets with integrity as the security requirement
for both files. The reachability graph is generated capturing all processes that can
modify these two files. The reachability graph as illustrated in Figure 4.3 shows
direct dependency as: (a) P1 can modify F1 (b) P2 and P3 can modify F3, and
the indirect dependency as: (a) P1 can modify P2 and P2 modify F3 (b) P4 can
modify P2 and P2 modify F3 (c) P4 can modify P3 and P3 modify F3. All of this
can be generated during the monitoring phase. Now, later on if P5 tries to access









Figure 4.3: Asset Relationship Example.
Weights on these edges can be obtained by accumulating the data flows of the
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between nodes. It should be noted that weights can be assigned to the edges of the
reachability graph. These weights can represent the access frequency, access time,
access period, along with other parameters. Using the assigned weights, we can
determine the probability of violating the integrity to F3 if P2 is compromised.
4.4 System Calls
The data flow or the relationship between files or processes mentioned previously
can be caught by monitoring system calls. In [2] the cycle of systems is explained
and shown in Figure 4.4. The steps are shown from the system call initiation to
its completeness. Let us consider that I/O request is initiated by a user process
to read some data. The following are the steps needed to execute the I/O request.
• The system call code is executed in the kernel to check the parameters
correctness if the block of the data needed to be read is available in the
buffer cache.
• If the data is ready the block will be returned to the process and that I/O
considered to be completed.
• If the block is not available then a physical I/O request must be sent to the
device driver mostly by in-kernel message or subroutine call.
• The device controller receive the data in kernel buffer space, by sending
command to the device controller.
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• The device controller writes into the device control register, then the device
controller will transfer the data by operate the device hardware.
• The driver will check for transfer completion by polling the data status or
by receiving an interrupt from Direct Memory Access (DMA) controller if
the driver has assigned a DMA transfer by kernel memory
• The device driver signaled by the interrupt handler.
• The device driver signal the kernel I/O with a request has been completed
to proceed on with that I/O request.
• The kernel transfer data from its memory space to the user processor space.
• The second step can be executed and the I/O is completed.
4.5 Proposed Security System
As shown in Figure 4.5, our approach consists of 4 phases, namely information
collection, monitoring, decision, and feedback. In the information collection phase,
we identify critical assets and their security requirements, while the monitoring
phase captures system calls that need to be investigated by the decision phase. The
decision phase assures that critical assets security requirements are not violated.
If there is an attempt of violation, a decision is needed to deal with this attempt
and alert the security system. Finally, the need for feedback phase comes into play
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Figure 4.4: The life cycle of system calls. Adapted from [2].
it means that there are unusual events and therefore our security system takes
these events into consideration.
4.5.1 Information Collection Phase
This phase involves collecting information about the guest operating system, the
critical assets, and the security requirements of these critical assets. Critical assets



















Figure 4.5: Asset based model.
managed by the guest virtual machine. Therefore, the paths of these objects are
collected along with their security requirements. In addition, information related
to the guest operating system is also collected such as operating system type,
system calls and how these system calls map to security requirements. It should
be noted that critical assets are always associated with security requirements.
4.5.1.1 Critical Assets Identification
The objective here is to identify critical assets along with their security require-
ments. The asset owner provides this information to the security practitioner.
After the critical assets are identified, the security requirement for each asset must
be also specified by the asset owner. For example, in a University environment,
the Registrar database might be identified as the critical asset. This identifica-
tion is done by the University Board. The University Board might require only
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“integrity” of the Registrar database because as long as “integrity” is preserved,
the University still can issue transcripts and degree certificates. To the University
Board, “availability” and “confidentiality” might not be as important as “integrity”
for the University Registrar database. The security practitioner needs to identify
the system files representing the University Registrar database which is referred
as r. In addition, the application(s) used to access the critical asset, let us say it
is process p1, needs also to be identified by the security practitioner. This means
that the Registrar database identified as a critical asset can be accessed only by
p1. Hence, p1 is the only authorized process to modify the Registrar database.
Therefore, the Information Collection Phase will generate critical assets that
can be provided as a simple list, a prioritized list, or a more complex represen-
tation. For the purpose of simplicity and clarity, the critical assets might be
represented by C which is a set of 2-tuple elements containing critical asset and
policy. Each critical asset has a policy composing of the critical asset’s secu-
rity requirement and the set of processes authorized to access the critical asset.
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 represent C and pr respectively.
C = {(r, Pr)} (4.1)
Pr = {integrity, {p1}} (4.2)
As shown in Equation 4.1, C has one direct critical asset r while Equation 4.2
defines the policy of r (Pr) as only process p1 is authorized to modify r.
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4.5.1.2 Reachability Graph
Automatically capturing the low-level details, during which the interactions be-
tween files and processes are tracked in order to identify direct or indirect de-
pendencies among all the system assets. For instance, in a database server, the
administrator only needs to list the sensitive database files, and our security sys-
tem later marks the process “mysqld” as critical because it is in charge of reading
and modifying the databases. Such a design greatly reduces the resources and
time spent by administrators in deploying our security system.
The reachability graph captures the low-level interrelationships between the
critical assets identified by the user and any other objects in the system. In a
nutshell, the reachability graph tells us which processes and files are used to reach
the critical assets identified in the Assets Identification step. This is established by
intercepting system calls at the hypervisor-level. Particularly, we will identify all
low-level objects that cause data dependencies with the critical assets identified in
the previous phase. For example, the reachability graph found that process p1 gets
the information from process p2 which reads from file f . All processes and files
involved in this cycle (i.e., p1, p2, and f) are added as critical assets. It should
be noted that all low-level critical assets will have “integrity” as their security
requirement because any unauthorized modification to the low-level critical assets
can violate the security requirement of the critical assets identified by the user.
For example if f is modified by unauthorized user, the “integrity” of r is violated.
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C = {(p1, Pp1), (p2, Pp2), (f, Pf )} (4.3)
Pp1 = Pp2 = Pf = {integrity, {}} (4.4)
As shown in Equation 4.3, C has three new critical assets namely, p1, p2, and
f . Equation 4.4 equates the policies of p1, p2, and f as no process is authorized
to modify their respective critical assets. Here, the policy for each critical asset
is a set of processes authorized to access the critical asset without violating its
security requirement. Policies can be more complicated. For example, we can use
one-time passcode as well as time, date, or frequency of access to the critical asset.
The low-level critical assets identified by the reachability graph will be added
to the high-level critical assets identified by the assets owner as shown in Equations
4.5 and 4.6.
C = {(r, Pr), (p1, Pp1), (p2, Pp2), (f, Pf )} (4.5)
Pr = {integrity, {p1}}, Pp1 = Pp2 = Pf = {integrity, {}} (4.6)
4.5.1.3 Scope of Control
The security requirements need to be mapped to system calls. Knowing the
guest operating system type, system calls, as well as the security requirement,
the mapper will map system calls that must be prevented to preserve the se-
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curity requirement. For example, the following system calls, namely NtWriteFile
and NtSetInformationFile must be prevented to preserve “integrity”. NtDeleteFile
and NtSetInformationFile system calls must be prevented to preserve “availabil-
ity”. Likewise, NtReadFile, NtOpenFile, NtCreateFile, and NtSetInformationFile
system calls must be prevented to preserve “confidentiality”.
To catch the indirect relationships to the critical assets, we can consider the
data flow direction [18]. For confidentiality, the data flows outwards starting from
the critical asset. For the integrity on the other hand, data flows towards the
critical asset. Finally, availability data flows in and out of the critical asset. The
data flow is going from process to file for a write system call. For example, if the
relationship between process p1 and file f1 is write, then the corresponding system
call will be (NtWriteFile, p1, f1) and the data flow will be from p1 to f1. But
if the relationship between p1 and f1 is read, then the corresponding system call
will be (NtReadFile, p1, f1) and the data flow will be from f1 to p1. By tracing
the data flow we can identify the indirect critical assets all along the reachability
path.
It should be noted that all objects included in the scope of control should
have integrity as the security requirement. In addition, all objects in the scope of




We assume a scope of control is shown in Figure 4.6 and the security requirement
for r is integrity. The data flow is indicated by the dashed arrows. Therefore, all
objects along these dashed arrows will be included as critical assets. For further
illustration and clarification, Table 4.2 outlines some cases and whether these cases
should be included in the scope of control. All objects included in the scope of






Figure 4.6: Integrity: indirect assets added to the scope of control.
Table 4.2: Integrity: validating the scope of control.
Scenario Scope of Control
Will be included Will not be included
if pz is reading from r
if pz is writing to r
if pa is reading from p1
if pa is writing to p1
if pb is reading from p2
if pb is writing to p2
if pn is reading from p9
if pn is writing to p9
if py is reading from f
if py is writing to f
Confidentiality Example
We assume a scope of control is shown in Figure 4.7 and the security requirement
for r is confidentiality. The data flow is indicated by the dashed arrows. Therefore,
all objects along these dashed arrows will be included as critical assets. For further
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illustration and clarification, Table 4.3 outlines some cases and whether these cases
should be included in the scope of control. All objects included in the scope of






Figure 4.7: Confidentiality: indirect assets added to the scope of control.
Table 4.3: Confidentiality: validating the scope of control.
Scenario Scope of Control
Will be included Will not be included
if pz is reading from r
if pz is writing to r
if pa is reading from p1
if pa is writing to p1
if pb is reading from p2
if pb is writing to p2
if pn is reading from p9
if pn is writing to p9
if py is reading from f
if py is writing to f
Availability Example
We assume a scope of control is shown in Figure 4.8 and the security requirement
for r is availability. The data flow is indicated by the dashed arrows. Therefore,
all objects along these dashed arrows will be included as critical assets. We notice
that the direction of data flow is not considered when the security requirement
is availability. So regardless of the direction, if there is a data flow between an
object and the critical asset, then this object should be added to the scope of
control. For further illustration and clarification, Table 4.4 outlines some cases
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and whether these cases should be included in the scope of control. All objects












Figure 4.8: Availability: indirect assets added to the scope of control.
Table 4.4: Availability: validating the scope of control.
Scenario Scope of Control
Will be included Will not be included
if pz is reading from r
if pz is writing to r
if pa is reading from p1
if pa is writing to p1
if pb is reading from p2
if pb is writing to p2
if pn is reading from p9
if pn is writing to p9
if py is reading from f
if py is writing to f
4.5.2 Monitoring Phase
This is the phase responsible for virtual machine introspection by collecting system
calls generated by the virtual machine without its knowledge since system calls
are intercepted and logged at the hypervisor-level. As shown in Algorithm 1, this
phase starts by initializing S, the set of intercepted system calls. This phase can
monitor only data flows to the critical assets or monitor all system calls. In the
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case of “before deployment”, we need to monitor and log all system calls to a file
to be processed to generate the reachability graph. While in the case of “after
deployment”, we need to know if the captured system call s is trying to access
any critical asset c ∈ C. Then, we have to decide if s needs further inspection. If
s is trying to access c ∈ C, then add s to S and pass s to the Decision Phase for
further investigation.
Algorithm 1: Monitoring Phase.
1 S = {}; //initializing the set of intercepted system calls
2 if Before Deployment then
3 intercepted system calls = All;
4 else
5 intercepted system calls = Specified;
6 end
7 foreach intercepted system call do
8 Parse s //get c and any other relevant information;
9 S = S + s //for possible post-mortem analysis;
10 if After Deployment then
11 if ( c ∈ C ) then




Figure 4.9 shows a sample of intercepted system calls generated by processes
running in the virtual machine. These processes are being monitored by our secu-
rity system at the hypervisor-level. Suppose that the file abc.txt (which appears
in the second system call) is in C, then only the second system call will be added
to S.
It should be noted that our system does asset-based monitoring. In our system,
system calls are treated independently and no conclusion is inferred regarding the
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Figure 4.9: Snapshot from raw system calls.
behavior of theses system calls. In other approaches, monitoring is done in order
to learn behavior or match signatures.
4.5.3 Decision Phase
The goal of this phase is to catch any attempts to violate the security requirements
of critical assets. This is done by assuring that s obeys the critical asset’s policy.
Algorithm 2 outlines the steps of this phase. The algorithm starts by accepting
the input data passed from the Monitoring Phase namely, C and s. We start by
initializing the “decision” to “allow”. Then, we test if the asset c specified in s
matches any critical assets specified in C. Next, we check if the process p and the
system call name n specified in s is among the allowed processes in the policy of
the critical asset. If p is trying to access c ∈ C and this process is not allowed,
then the “decision” is set to “prevent”.
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Algorithm 2: Decision Phase.
Data:
The critical asset set C
The intercepted system call s
Result: Either prevent or allow
1 decision ← “allow”; //initialize decision to allow
2 if (s contains c ∈ C) then
3 if (s violates Pc) then
4 decision ← “prevent”;





This phase is triggered if certain events are met such as a prevention decision, a
controlled modification, or uncontrolled modification. The information taken from
the “decision phase” must be fed back to the security system. Prevented decisions
coming from the “decision phase” must be inspected. This inspection can be done
by the security practitioner. Here, we can employ different strategies to harden
accessibility to our critical assets. What we can do here is to make the attack
surface dynamic using techniques such as bio-inspired MTD, cloud-based MTD,
and dynamic network configuration. It should be noted that this dynamicity is
done without observing attack behavior. Controlled modification happens when
a critical asset, critical process, or security requirement needs to be added or
modified. Those changes must be reflected into the security system. Uncontrolled
modification happens when an MTD approach is applied to dynamically change
some attributes of the critical assets such as a name of a process that is allowed
to access one of the critical files.
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4.6 Security System Flow Chart
After our security system is deployed, the flow of our security system is shown in
Figure 4.10. In our system, the work flow starts with catching every system call.
In some operating system such as Windows 7, there is about 700 set of routines.
Those 700 routines can be accessed by system call. In user mode applications,
system calls must be called to access these set of routines, while in kernel mode
they can be called directly. There are two types of these routines [115] namely,
NT group and ZW group. NT group can be called from user space when there is
no trust while ZW group can be called from the kernel space when there is trust.
Then, a file name will be extracted (if any) from the in the system call param-
eters. There are more than 4 categories of these system calls. These categories
have different number of parameters spanning from one to four parameters. If a
file name is found, the file name will be extracted from the system call and stored
in a string for later processing.
The stored file name will be matched with the critical file names. If the file
name is found in that list, then more processing is needed. Processing done and
we fetch information related to that file name such as the security requirement
and the process name. Finally, comparison and decision will be taken to either
prevent or allow the system calls. Our security system will prevent the system
call from continuity by nulling it’s parameters if the the decision is to prevent the
system call, the decision is to allow the system calls, then our security system will
allow the execution to proceed as normal.
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In this chapter, we present the design of our asset-based security system. In
our design, we decompose our system into subsystems in order to have a layered
architecture. In each of these layers, we state what functions are needed to be
performed. As such, we present a systematic approach of defining all system
components to satisfy the needs and requirements in order to design a coherent
and well-running system. Both the functional and the operational architectures of
our proposed security system are presented to illustrate the working order of the
various system components as well as information flow between these components.
In general, this is a trade off between the comprehensiveness of the monitoring and
the performance. However, the system we propose does not require comprehensive
monitoring of the guest OS, in fact, it just requires monitoring system calls. Which
is available in almost all hypervisor-level monitoring solutions.
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5.1 Overall System Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows the overall asset-based security system architecture. Above the
hardware subsystem and as shown in Figure 5.1, the hypervisor is composed of
two subsystems, namely the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) and the Virtual







Figure 5.1: Overview of the system architecture.
VMM is a software program that sets the virtualization environment and
this basically will enable Virtual Machines (VMs) bootstrapping and governance.
VMM manages this operation on top of the hardware layer. VMM provides the
virtualization functionality. Once it is installed, VMM facilitates VMs creation
with separate operating systems and applications running in each VM. VMM sup-
ports the backend operation of allocated VMs by assigning adequate computing
power, main memory, secondary storage, as well as other I/O resources. VMM
also creates a unified interface for managing the entire virtualization environment.
VMI is basically inspecting the contents of VM in real-time without the agree-
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ment nor the knowledge of the guest operating system. In our design, we chose
VMI because of this specific property. This contrasts with classic monitoring
software on physical systems where the monitoring process runs on the physi-
cal system itself. As such, the monitoring system is reachable and indeed other
processes running in the guest operating system can know that they are being
monitored. What is more, when a virus or malware penetrates a given physical
machine, its first task is to deactivate any monitoring process and prevent in-
stallation of such processes. This way, the malware can keep on controlling the
physical machine.
With our design, it is impossible for processes running on the guest operating
system to deactivate or even know of the existence of a monitoring tool. That is
why the concept of the VMI is the choice in our design.
5.2 Functional Architecture
As shown in Figure 5.2, the functional architecture is presented and the aim is to
show the segregation of functionalities across the different layers of the architec-
ture. On top of the hardware layer, the hardware abstraction and the creation
and management of multiple computing environment instances are the functions
of the virtualization layer. The hypervisor at this layer enables an agentless binary
analysis system to be built on top of it. This layer, the introspection layer, sets
the stage for tools and utilities to establish the core Asset-based functionalities of
our system. As depicted in the Figure, there are 6 core components in our secu-
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rity system. Critical assets identification along with their security requirements
and the low-level interrelationships between the critical assets are done by the
Identifier and the Generator components, respectively. The Mapper translates
the security requirements to corresponding system calls needed to be processed.
The monitoring functionality is carried out by the Monitor while the Decision
Maker component will inspect the system call after it has been captured by the
Monitor. Finally, a decision needs to be made by the Decision Maker to either
prevent or allow the execution of the system call. The Decision Maker also alerts























Figure 5.2: Functional architecture design of the proposed security system.
5.3 Operational Architecture
In this section, we describe how operations are employed to accomplish func-
tions. The primary objective is to show the derivation of operational profile from
functional profile. In the operational profile, we include details such as tasks, op-
erational elements, and information flows required to accomplish or support the
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functionalities of our security system. We show the operational architecture be-
fore and after the security system deployment. Figure 5.3 shows the operational
architecture before deployment where tasks and information are depicted as they
flow between the “Information Collection” and the “Monitoring” phases. Assets
owners are responsible for providing the name(s) of the asset(s) needed to be pro-
tected. Also, the security requirements for these assets need to be provided by the
asset owner. The name(s) of the asset(s) as well as the security requirement(s)
are given in high level names.
After consulting the security mapping and the security requirements, the map-
per translates the security requirements to corresponding system calls. For ex-
ample NtReadFile, NtOpenFile, NtCreateFile, and NtSetInformationFile system
calls must be prevented to preserve “confidentiality” when using windows 7 as the
operating system.
After collecting input from the assets owners as well as system call input from
the operating system with corresponding system calls coming from mapper, the
generator will be ready for processing. Critical assets (high and low) with their
security policy, system calls, security requirements translated to system calls will
be fed in and given to the generator. In turn, the generator creates the critical
asset scope of control. Now, the critical assets scope of control will be used as a
reference in the security system after deployment.
If the generator is given only the critical assets and the system calls, then the




















Figure 5.3: Operational architecture before system deployment.
After deploying the security system as in Figure 5.4, the “Monitoring” and “De-
cision” phases begin. The monitor starts collecting system calls by the “Collector”.
The collection here will be done to system calls, which will lead to catching ev-
ery critical operation. The parses then processes collected system calls extracting
needed information such as process name, system call name, and file name. The
decision maker starts checking user processes that initiate system calls and con-
sulting with the reference model (i.e. the critical assets scope of control). The
decision maker reports any system call in violation of the reference model. Conse-
quently, the system call execution will be interrupted and stopped from execution.
If a violation is detected, a warning message is send by the decision maker to the
tuner in our security system. The tuner can employ different strategies to harden
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accessibility to our critical assets. What we can do here is to make the attack
surface dynamic using techniques such as bio-inspired MTD, cloud-based MTD,
and dynamic network configuration. It should be noted that this dynamicity is












Figure 5.4: Operational architecture after system deployment.
5.4 System Design Validation
In this section, we discuss how the contributions of our security system are
achieved by our design choices. One of the main objectives of our security system
is to build an asset-based security solution. As such, our design falls under the
information security arena not under the physical nor the e-ICT security spaces.
Furthermore, our security system defends these assets and hence our next objec-
tive is to build a defense-based security solution. This is achieved in our design by
having all system components independent of the attack vector. System compo-
nents start by collecting information regarding the critical assets to be protected
78
and then build other components to defend the identified assets irregardless of at-
tack vectors or surfaces as shown in Figure 5.4. This makes our design proactive
since the assets and their security requirements are set before the system goes
online and without considering any attack vector. The passive objective means
that the attacker will not notice the existence of our system. This is achieved
because our system does VMI and operates at the hypervisor level as depicted
in Figures 5.1, 6.1, and 6.2. VMI is basically inspecting the contents of VM in
real-time without the agreement nor the knowledge of the guest operating system.
In our design, we chose VMI because of this specific property. This contrasts with
classic monitoring software on physical systems where the monitoring process runs
on the physical system itself. As such, the monitoring system is reachable and
indeed other processes running in the guest operating system can know that they
are being monitored. What is more, when a virus or malware penetrates a given
physical machine, its first task is to deactivate any monitoring process and prevent
installation of such processes. This way, the malware can keep on controlling the
physical machine.
With our design, it is impossible for processes running on the guest operating
system to deactivate or even know of the existence of a monitoring tool. That is




The evaluation environment is setup as shown in Figure 5.1. We followed the
overall architecture and hence the layered design presented in chapter 5. In this
chapter, we first discuss the system specification used in the evaluation environ-
ment. Then, we discuss in details our virtualized environment and the tools used
to achieve VMI. We finally present the benchmarking tool used for time measure-
ment and how the evaluation environment is setup.
6.1 System Specification
We list here the system specification including hardware, system software, and
application software used to perform the evaluation experiments:
• Host machine
– Type: Alien PC
– Processor: Intel Core I7 Quad Core 4700MQ @ 2.4GHz
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– RAM: 24 GB
– HDD: 1TB @ 5400RPM
– Host OS: Ubuntu 16.10 64Bit
• Guest virtual machine
– OS: Windows 7 64Bit




– Hypervisor tool: QEMU, Xen
– Binary analysis tool: DECAF, DRAKVUF
– Benchmarking Application Startup Timer: AppTimer
6.2 Virtualization Environment
To set up the virtualization environment, a software layer is needed to virtualize
all of the resources of a physical machine (host machine). This software layer is
known in the literature as hypervisor or VMM. The hypervisor also defines and
supports multiple VMs execution [116]. In our evaluation environment, we used
two hypervisors, namely Quick Emulator (QEMU) and Xen.
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6.2.1 QEMU
QEMU is a CPU powerful emulator that can emulate a group of processor types.
In 2005, QEMU [117] was presented as a fast machine emulator using an original
portable dynamic translator. It emulates several CPUs on several hosts like (x86,
PowerPC, ARM, SPARC) in addition to Alpha and MIPS. QEMU has the ability
to support full system emulation in which a complete and unmodified operating
system is run in a virtual machine. QEMU is an open source hosted hypervisor
that executes hardware virtualization. As such, QEMU can act as a hypervisor
and its strength and popularity come from being an emulator. QEMU is consid-
ered Type-II hypervisor that runs as other computer applications do, at the top
of an OS.
6.2.2 Xen
Xen was first released in 2003 [118] with the Para Virtualization (PV) approach.
The Xen Project is an open source bare-metal hypervisor making it possible to
run many instances of a single operating system or different operating systems in
parallel on a single physical machine. It is the only available open source as bare-
metal hypervisor . It is used as the basis for a number of different commercial and
open source applications, such as security applications, Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS), desktop or server virtualization, embedded and hardware appliances [119]
[120]. The Xen Project is the leading virtualization platform that powers some of
the largest Clouds giants such as Amazon Web Services and Verizon Cloud. It is
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also integrated into multiple Cloud orchestration projects such as OpenStack and
CloudStack [121].
In Xen PV, hardware virtualization is not needed so guest kernels are modified
to avoid binary translation. This way, the guest os can run on Xen hypervisor
and detect hypercalls [122]. On the other hand, Xen supports Fully Virtualization
(FV) with the Hardware-assisted Virtualization (HVM) option. This option needs
CPU with Virtualization technology such as Intel-VT. Therefore, there is no need
to modify guest kernels which will not be able to detect virtualization. Due to
this, PV would be faster than FV and FV-HVM [123]. In HVM, when critical
instructions are caught, traps are put in place so the hypervisor can emulate it in
software [122].
Xen comes in different modes or virtualization types. It should be noted that
all hypervisors (either Type-II/hosted or Type-I/bare-metal) need an underly-
ing OS. As such, bare metal also has an operating system on top of which the
hypervisor runs [123].
6.3 Binary Analysis
After setting the virtualization environment, a binary analysis tool is needed to
manipulate the guest OS behavior. Binary analysis can be achieved using various
techniques [124] such as the Dynamic Executable Code Analysis Framework (DE-
CAF) and DRAKVUF. These two possible valid binary analysis tools are used in
our model. DECAF is built on the top of QEMU with TEMU as a sub-component.
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TEMU, Vine, and Rudder are the three main components for BitBlaze [125] [126].
The common technique used among them is capturing persistent changes to sys-
tem state which done by emulating all code in software.
Injecting breakpoints rather than just logging system calls, is another tech-
nique applied to achieve binary analysis. This technique is used by DRAKVUF.
In this technique, context switches or system calls are caught and a breakpoint is
injected to control the behavior of the execution thread [124].
6.3.1 DECAF
DECAF [127] is a dynamic binary analysis platform based on QEMU [128]. It
is virtual machine based, multi-target, whole system dynamic binary analysis
framework able to do introspection as Just-In-Time VM. Authors in [128] provided
DECAF plugins such as Instruction Tracer, Keylogger Detector, and API Tracer.
Those plugins can be modified or updated as needed. DECAF was implemented
using C and C++ with approximately 20 thousands lines in code, and evaluated
using CPU2006 SPEC benchmarks showing average overhead of 12% for VMI. To
show the flexibility and scalability of DECAF, DroidScope, a dynamic Android





6.4.1 QEMU and DECAF
In our environment as shown in Figure 6.1, we assume having DECAF which is
integrated with QEMU. The approach works by first loading a plugin to QEMU
at runtime. This plugin works by applying a system hook for a specified system
call for each newly created process in the system. We will have a callback function
that is triggered whenever the system call is fired in the CPU. This is done by first
checking the value of the EIP register and comparing it with the target system
call address. If it is true we trigger a callback function that retrieves the return
address and parameters in a struct. We can use that struct to retrieve useful
information about the generated system call.
The approach we used take the advantage of using DECAF which provides
a JIT VMI; allowing for run time adjustments for guest operating system. We
can load the plugin at any time and get the required results. Also, our approach
provides malware analyzers with good information about the specified system call
by enquiring the system call parameters for further analysis. Additionally, the
technique we used allow for system wide API hooking by tracking all newly created
processes. More importantly, it is transparent to the guest operating systems
making it difficult for running processes to detect if they are being monitored.
85
Figure 6.1: QEMU and DECAF evaluation environment.
6.4.2 Xen and DRAKVUF
We used the Xen [120] hypervisor to host the virtual machines and DRAKVUF
[130] to provide agentless VMI. With privileges gained from Xen. DRAKVUF
can create full VM clones by Copy-on-Write (CoW) memory interface and Copy-
on-Write disk capability from Linux LVM. LibVMI library enables DRAKVUF to
make use of DMA. LibVMI is “a C library with Python bindings that makes it
easy to monitor the low-level details of a running virtual machine by viewing its
memory, trapping on hardware events, and accessing the vCPU registers. This is
called virtual machine introspection” [131].
At selected code locations, breakpoints are written into the VMs memory.
When these breakpoints are reached, DRAKVUF triggers transfer of control to
XEN. To achieve stealth, DRAKVUF hijacks an arbitrary process within the VM
by using active VMI through breakpoint injection. Rekall is a memory analysis
framework [132]. Rekall comes in place to parse the debug data to establish a
map of internal kernel functions instead of using the brute force methods (i.e
signature based scans) in order for DRAKVUF to automatically locate the kernel
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in memory. Creating and then reverting analysis container is faster than imaging
then reverting physical machines [130]. DRAKVUF is the doing the former while
DECAF is doing the latter. That is why DRAKVUF has better performance than
DECAF.
Our evaluation environment using Xen and DRAKVUF is shown in Figure 6.2.
As shown in the Figure DRAKVUF reside on Domain zero (Dom0). With some
privileges DRAKVUF can make clones from the VM to be accessed later, using
LibVMI with DMA to monitor context switching and system calls. With Rekall













Figure 6.2: Xen and DRAKVUF evaluation environment.
6.5 Evaluation Environment Setup
We setup our evaluation environment using the latest version of Ubuntu 16.04
LTS, Xen 4.9, and DRAKVUF 0.9. We installed Ubuntu 16.04 as the host OS
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and then installed Xen. Few technical steps are done to merge Xen with Ubuntu
before preparing the environment for DRAKVUF installation. We start installing
LibVMI and Rekall and then DRAKVUF to complete the VMI process. Now, our
virtualization environment is ready and we can finally install a guest OS in a VM.
We used Windows 7 as the guest OS and now we can monitor the guest OS from
the hypervisor level using DRAKVUF through VNC software.
Full details for the installation guide can be found in Appendix A. For com-
pleteness and clarity purposes, these detailed and sequenced steps are summarized
as follows:
1. Install the latest version of Ubuntu 16.04 LTS as the host OS.
2. Prepare the environment for virtualization by installing some needed pack-
ages such as gcc, python-dev, libc6-dev-i386, libvncserver-dev, and libjson-
c-dev.
3. Install a version of Xen that includes a built-in XSM policy required for
DRAKVUF.
4. Dedicate some resources specifically for Demo0. In our setup, we dedicated
24 GB of RAM with 4 CPU cores for Demo0.
5. Reboot the and select the following option: “Ubuntu GNU/Linux, with
Xen hypervisor”. This option guarantees that Demo0 is working with Xen
support.
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6. Setup LVM Volume Group to hold your VMs disks. Then, create a volume.
We created a 20 GB volume for the guest OS.
7. Install Windows 7 from ISO. Enter the LibVMI folder in the DRAKVUF
folder and build it.
8. Build and install LibVMI and ReKall [133] [134].
9. Create the Rekall profile for the Windows domain.
10. Test if LibVMI is working by running vmi-process-list.
11. Install DRAKVUF. Trace the execution of the system by picking which
DRAKVUF plugins to run. Doing this step will prevent all mentioned plu-
gins from running.
12. DRAKVUF now can run with the selected plugins that point to the vir-
tual machine with the following characteristics: domain name “windows7-
sp1”, Rekall profile name “windows7-sp1.rekall.json”. It should be mentioned
that these names contain necessary information about the VM kernel, and
therefore we can now all of the guest OS behavior can be monitored by
DRAKVUF.
6.6 Application Startup Timer
The Application Startup Timer (AppTimer) is a benchmark utility that will mea-
sure how long an application has been running. AppTimer is capable of running
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an application multiple times and calculating how long it takes for the application
to reach a state where user input is being accepted before exiting the application.
After each run of the application, AppTimer will attempt to close the application
in an automated fashion while logging the startup time measurements to a log file.
It’s main use is in benchmarking an application’s startup time. This can be useful




This chapter contains two parts of our system evaluation. The first one considers
verification and validation of the security system and the second one considers the
performance of the security system.
We conducted several experiments to test the effectiveness, the agility, and the
performance of our security model. We started our performance evaluation process
in QEMU and DECAF environment and then switched to Xen and DRAKVUF
environment. This is explained in sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. System call
mapping experiments are conducted in section 7.4. We verified and validated our
security system in section 7.5. Our security system is evaluated for agility and
overhead in sections 7.7 to 7.9.
7.1 Performance Metrics
We conducted a series of evaluation studies to examine the overhead of our security
system. The performance measures used in these studies are:
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• Response Time. This metric computes the time from when the user submits
the request to the time the system completes the response and is calculated
as follows:
R = Tres − Treq (7.1)
where Treq is the time the user finishes the request and Tres is time the
system completes the response.
• Generated System Call. This metric measures the number of times a certain
user application asks the kernel to execute a privileged I/O instruction.
• Performance Ratio. This metric is calculated as the quotient of the divided





where Ron is the response time when our security system is activated and Roff
is the response time when our security system is not activated. This performance
metric measures our security system overhead or slowdown in terms of response
time.
Figure 7.1 shows two possible implication of “Response Time”. It is either the
time between the user finishing a request and the time when the system starts or
completes the response. In our evaluation experiments, we adopted the second
definition as outlined above because we want to measure the delay incurred by






























Figure 7.1: Definition of response time. Adapted from [3] .
We also examine the number of system calls generated by applications. We do
this for two reasons. We want to calculate the number of system calls captured
by the monitoring phase and then calculate the number of system calls needed for
the analysis phase.
7.2 QEMU and DECAF Experiments
We did the experiments using windows XP as the guest OS, Linux Ubuntu 12.04
as host OS, QEMU version 2.3, and DECAF. We use NtCreateFile system call
as an example for the system call. To test our results, we create our own process
that only calls the NtCreateFile system call.
We see from Figure 7.2 that we are installing the hook upon knowing the
address space of the NtCreateFile system call. This enables us to create a virtual
memory to store the hook structs and call stack of the function call.
At this stage, we are ready to test the code. We tested our code against
notepad.exe and we got the following results. In Figure 7.3, we see that process
93
Figure 7.2: Hooking NtCreateFile.
id, the process name and the filename. The process name can be retrieved by
examining the CR3 register to check the page table range then find the corre-
sponding process address space. The filename retrieval is system dependent and
highly relies on the file system in the guest operating system. In our example, we
have the following signature of the NtCreateFile system call from MSDN.
Figure 7.3: Monitoring notepad.exe.
We modify some plugins in DECAF, namely we use API_TRACER and
HOOKAPITESTS, with some modification through the code we generate a list of
all system calls called by certain process using the first plugins API_TRACER,
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using the second plugins we were able to catch all the process used to call a cer-
tain system call, from both plugins we can generate the reachability graph, which
could used in later.
The call stack contains the addresses of all of these parameters. The third
attribute (OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES) is a structure that contains an ObjectName
struct, as shown in Figure 7.4. We can then use the ObjectName struct to retrieve
the full path of the file.
Figure 7.4: OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES class.
We conclude from that we have to do an extra work to retrieve extra informa-
tion about the hook system call. This will be highly system dependent and relies
directly on the signature of the system call and the data structures and data types
used to store parameters.
7.3 DRAKVUF Integration
Instead of developing our security system from scratch, we utilized DRAKVUF
and developed our security system around it. As explained earlier, DRAKVUF
provides a suitable environment for malware analysis. This is established by
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Figure 7.5: NtCreateFile parameters.
capturing system calls. Therefore, the idea behind developing DRAKVUF was
behavior-analysis and the captured system calls ignored anything to do with as-
sets. In order for us to utilize DRAKVUF in our security system, we need to get
asset information when capturing system calls. We started modifying DRAKVUF
to include filename as a parameter in the system calls. searching for the file name
in the parameter of the system calls requires a lot of sting comparisons as the
name of the file stored randomly regarding the system call, so it could be the
second parameter or the last one, one the other hand it requires tracing efforts,
as it could be a pointer rather than a String.
In the 30th of June 2017, a new version of DRAKVUF was released
(DRAKVUF 0.5), that includes the filename as a parameter in the system call.
Furthermore, the new release of AVG Internet Security - Unlimited [135] and
Bitdefender 2017 [136], contains an option to protect some folders from ransom
attacks, by preventing the untrusted application to access these folders, and for
sure the user himself can customize the trusted application list and the protected
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folders. This was a motivation for us as the assets importance is gain attention
from the research community.
Modifying DRAKVUF
To develop our security system, we have to do the following changes to
DRAKVUF: It should be noted that all these changes are included in Appendix
A.
1. Asset Identification Plugin: We added this plugin to have the Critical
Assets Identification capability.
2. Reachability Graph Plugin: We did this by utilizing some existing
DRAKVUF Python plugins to generate the reachability graph.
3. Monitoring Plugin: We took advantage of DRAKVUF breakpoints to
selectively modify call functions in the SYSCALLS plugin.
4. Decision Plugin: We added this plugin to DRAKVUF to enable the pre-
vention as well as the feedback capabilities of our security system.
In a nutshell, we modified the SYSCALLS plugin within the DRAKVUF sys-
tem and injected breakpoints only to selected system calls that could breach files
security requirements instead of injecting breakpoints to all NT system calls. The
reason of this modification is enhancing DRAKVUF performance. Furthermore,
we modified the callback functions within the SYSCALLS plugin and corrupted
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the system call arguments. This measure was taken if the system call is in viola-
tion of as asset’s security requirement. We modified arguments in four registers,
namely RCX, RDX, R8, and R9. This ensures that the system call will never
access the asset.
7.4 System Calls Mapping
Our security system can analyze all or a subset of the captured system calls. To
improve performance in [6], monitored system calls were minimized to 29. Au-
thors in [6] monitored system calls related to malware behavior . They started
monitoring NtOpenFile and NtCreateFile. These two system calls affect file re-
naming and copying. Later, they added other network related system calls for a
total of 29 system calls.
In our experiments, we want to determine the system calls associated with “in-
tegrity”, “availability”, and “confidentiality”. As such, “writing, appending” state-
ments are associated with “integrity”. Similarly, “reading, opening” and “deleting,
renaming” are associated with “confidentiality” and availability, respectively.
In Figure 7.6 adopted from [2], the C user code invokes printf() statement.
This statement is intercepted by the C library, which interacts with the kernel
on behalf of the user program. Eventually, the printf() statement is mapped as
write() system call in kernel mode. Once the kernel executes the write() system
call, the returned value is passed to the user program.
























Figure 7.6: Example of standard library. Adapted from [2].
by the kernel on behalf of the user program. Such statements are referred to as
privileged statements [2]. At user space these statements call an interface library.
The interface library does mode switching and give the command to the kernel
which executes the system call. In order for our security system to capture the
system calls, we need first to know which system calls correspond to the privileged
statements (i.e. I/O privileged statements) invoked at user space.
As such, we need to map I/O privileged statements at the user space to the
system call at the kernel space. We conducted several experiments and examined
I/O privileged statements, namely open, view, delete, rename, write, read, and
append. It should be noted that in all of these experiments, our security system
is running. The following subsections outline our findings.
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7.4.1 Open
To get the system calls invoked when we open a file, we conducted the follow-
ing experiment: While hovering over a file, right-click and open the file with
“Notepad”. Examining the system call log file, we notice the following: (1) The
name of the file appeared in the log 11 times, (2) The system calls are invoked by
two processes namely, “explorer.exe” and “notepad.exe”. (3) The system calls are
NtQueryAttributesFile, NtQueryDirectoryFile, NtCreateFile, NtQueryVolumeIn-
formationFile, NtQueryInformationFile, NtCreateSection. The results of this ex-
periment are summarized in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Mapping open statement to system calls: without double click.








Table 7.2: Mapping open statement to system calls: with double click.














In MS Windows, we can view the content of a file without opening it. This is
doable by opening the folder containing the file in Windows Explorer then select-
ing the file. The file content will appear in the preview pane. Doing this, we
notice the following: (1) The name of the file appeared in the log 34 times. (2)
The system calls invoked are NtOpenFile, NtQueryAttributesFile, NtCreateFile,
NtFsControlFile, NtReadFile, and NtSetInformationFile. (3) All of them are gen-
erated by “explorer.exe”. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table
7.3.
Table 7.3: Mapping view statement to system calls.








Here, we want to capture the system calls generated when file is indirectly deleted
(i.e., sent to the recycle bin) or directly deleted (i.e., press the shift key with
the delete key). Pressing the delete key on the keyboard will send the file to
the recycle bin. On the other hand, pressing the shift key with the delete key
will delete the file immediately without sending it to the recycle bin. Doing this
experiment, we notice the following: (1) The name of the file appeared in the log
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11 times, (2) There are 5 system calls appeared to interact with the file. These
system calls are NtCreateFile, NtQueryDirectoryFile, NtQueryInformationFile,
NtSetInformationFile, and NtOpenFile. (3) All of the system calls are generated
by “explorer.exe”. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Mapping delete statement to system calls.







Renaming a file is done by hovering over the file, right-click, and then choosing
rename from the pop-up menu. Doing this experiment, we notice the following
for the original file: (1) The name of the original file appeared in the log 8 times.
(2) These system calls are NtQueryDirectoryFile, NtOpenFile, NtQueryInforma-
tionFile, NtSetInformationFile, and NtCreateFile. (3) All of the system calls
generated by “explorer.exe”.
For the new file, we notice the following: (1) The name of the file appeared
in the log 28 times. (2) The name of the file repeated 8 times were called by “ex-
ploror.exe” and 20 times by “SearchProtocol”. (3) The system calls generated gen-
erated by “explorer.exe” were NtQueryDirectoryFile, NtOpenFile, and NtQuery-
AttributesFile. (4) The system calls generated by “SearchProtocol” are NtCreate-
File, NtFsControlFile, NtQueryInformationFile, NtOpenFile, NtSetInformation-
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File, and NtReadFile.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 7.5. The Table shows
both of the results, namely results concerning the original file and results concern-
ing the new file.
Table 7.5: Mapping rename statement to system calls.
File Type System Call Repetition Process Name














7.4.5 Write and Save
This experiment is done in three steps:
• Step #1: Opening a file and modifying its content then check the log.
• Step #2: Opening a file, modifying its content, and then clicking the save
button. Then, check the log.
• Step #3: Opening a file, modifying its content, the click the exit button. A
dialogue box pop will ask the user to save the file. We press the save option
and check the log.
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For step #1, we notice the following: (1) The name of the file appeared in the
log 26 times. (2) The system calls are generated by “explorer.exe”, “notepad.exe”,
and “SearchProtocol”.
For step #2: we notice the same behavior as in step #1. In addition, we notice
the following: (1) The name of the file appeared 38 times in the log in total and
12 of them as new entry. (2) The system calls are generated by “explorer.exe”,
“notepad.exe”, and “SearchProtocol”.
As of step #3, the behavior was exactly as the one discussed in step #2. This
can be explained by the fact that the actions taken by the user process towards
the asset (i.e., the file) are the same. In step #3, we only delay the saving of the
file by closing it abnormally, which affect the sequence of the system calls.
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 7.6. The Table shows
the three results, namely results concerning step #1, step #2, and step #3. Since
step #2 and step #3 have the same results, they are combined in the same row
of Table 7.6.
7.4.6 Append
The objective of this experiment is to explore the different between appending
rather than writing to a file. In this experiment, we develop a C program “ap-
pendtotext.c” to append to an existing file and to a non-existing file. When the
file was not there, the system creates the file then append to it. For the case
where the file exits, the system directly append to the file.
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Table 7.6: Mapping write and save statements to system calls.
File Type System Call Repetition Process Name

















Step #2 NtQueryAttributesFile 4 explorer.exe
and NtQueryDirectoryFile 4


















In the case of the existing file, we notice the following: (1) The name of
the file appeared in the log 21 times. (2) These system calls are NtCreateFile,
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NtQueryVolumeInformationFile, NtQueryInformationFile,NtSetInformationFile,
NtWriteFile, NtFsControlFile, NtOpenFile, NtReadFile, NtQueryDirectoryFile,
and NtQueryAttributesFile. (3) The processes “appendtotxt.exe”, “SearchProto-
col”, and “explorer.exe” are responsible for generating the system calls. The results
of this experiment are summarized in Table 7.7. The Table shows the two results,
namely results concerning existing files and results concerning non-existing files.
Table 7.7: Mapping append statement to system calls.
File Status System Call Repetition Process Name






























7.4.7 Selected System Calls
The security requirements need to be mapped to system calls. This mapping is
done by the security practitioner. Knowing the guest operating system type, sys-
tem calls, as well as the security requirement, the security practitioner will identify
system calls that must be prevented to preserve the security requirement. For ex-
ample, the following system calls, namely NtWriteFile and NtSetInformationFile
must be prevented to preserve “integrity”. NtDeleteFile and NtSetInformationFile
system calls must be prevented to preserve “availability”. Likewise, NtReadFile,
NtOpenFile, NtCreateFile, and NtSetInformationFile system calls must be pre-
vented to preserve “confidentiality”. The meaning of these system calls are shown
in Table 7.8.
7.5 Verification and Validation
We conducted an experiment to verify and validate our prototype by running
the Task Manager within the virtual machine to provide the list of the running
processes. Our “Monitor” system calls plugin should provide the same list of
running processes assuming that all these processes are generating system calls.
Indeed and as illustrated in Figure 7.7, the running processes captured by the task
manager within the virtual machine are also captured by our security system.
In our next experiment, we exposed our prototype to an academic crypto-
ransomware identical to the famous jigsaw crypto-ransomware of which new vari-
ants just appeared in January 2018 [137]. A crypto-ransomware traverses interest-
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Table 7.8: Meaning of system calls.
System Call Meaning
NtCreateFile Creates a new file or directory, or opens an existing
file, device, directory, or volume.
NtCreateSection The ZwCreateSection routine creates a section object.
NtDeleteFile The ZwDeleteFile routine deletes the specified file.
NtFsControlFile The ZwFsControlFile routine sends a control code
directly to a specified file system or file system
filter driver, causing the corresponding driver to
perform the specified action.
NtOpenFile Opens an existing file, device, directory, or volume,
and returns a handle for the file object.
NtQueryAttributesFile Retrieves basic attributes for the specified file object.
NtQueryDirectoryFile The ZwQueryDirectoryFile routine returns various kinds
of information about files in the directory specified
by a given file handle.
NtQueryFullAttributesFile The ZwQueryFullAttributesFile routine supplies
network open information for the specified file.
NtQueryInformationFile The ZwQueryInformationFile routine returns various
kinds of information about a file object.
NtQueryVolumeInformationFile The ZwQueryVolumeInformationFile routine retrieves
information about the volume associated with a given file,
directory, storage device, or volume.
NtReadFile The ZwReadFile routine reads data from an open file.
NtSetInformationFile The ZwSetInformationFile routine changes various
kinds of information about a file object.
NtWriteFile The ZwWriteFile routine writes data to an open file.
ing directories and encrypts all files that match certain file extensions. The ran-
somware contains 3 files, namely Server.exe, ransomware.exe, and Unlocker.exe.
The Server.exe file emulates a connection between the victim machine and money
seeker. The server is used to store the victim’s information and the unique encryp-
tion key. The ransomware.exe file encrypts the files inside the victim’s machine
using AES-256-CTR and generates a list of the encrypted files and instruction for
decrypting them. After following the instructions and the payment is confirmed,
the encryption key and the Unlocker.exe can be used by the victim to decrypt the
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Figure 7.7: Process list generated within and outside the virtual machine.
files. According to [137] and the analysis done by [4] [138] [139], the Ransomware
process works in stages as follows:
1. Query the original file to be encrypted.
2. Create/Open temporary output file.
3. Read the content from the original file, encrypt it, and send the encrypted
content to the temporary file.
4. Close the original and the temporary files.
5. Move the contents of the temporary file to the original file.
6. Close both files and wait for all other original files to be. encrypted
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7. Rename the original file.
(a) Create a file with base64 equivalent filename.
(b) Move the encrypted content from the original file to the file with the
base64 equivalent filename.
(c) Delete the original file.
To further verify and validate our security system in capturing system calls,
we monitored the Ransomware process and captured any system call generated by
the process name “ransomware.exe” for file “issa.txt”. Once our security system
captures the system calls, the analysis of these system calls should follow the stages
outlined above. To relate the captured system calls to the number of stages, we
consulted [140] for the meaning of the system calls and we show our findings in
Table 7.8.
Table 7.9 shows the captured system calls, the file path accessed by ran-
somware.exe is accessing, and the corresponding stage number according to our
analysis. As shown in Table 7.9, the file to be encrypted “issa.txt” is queried so
that “ransomware.exe” can collect relevant information and then a temporary file
is created and opened. Stage 3 then starts by opening and reading from “isaa.txt”
and writing to the temporary file. Stage 4 then closes the original and the tem-
porary files. During the final stage (i.e. stage 7), “ransomware.exe” creates a file
with base64 equivalent filename and move the encrypted content from the original
file to the file with the base64 equivalent filename and finally deletes “issa.txt”.
This shows that our security system captured all system calls generated by ran-
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somware.exe and in the correct sequence.
Table 7.9: System calls initiated by ransomware.exe for issa.txt.




























Finally, we conducted an experiment to verify that “ransomware.exe” is work-
ing properly in our environment. Therefore, we did not identify any critical files
on the virtual machine and ran “ransomware.exe” on the virtual machine while
our security system is running on the hypervisor-level. The ransomware process
was able to encrypt all files. This is expected since there are no critical files
and therefore our security system has nothing to defend and the ransomware was
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allowed to encrypt all files.
7.6 Generating Reachability Graph
7.6.1 Direct reachability graph
We run the system in a secure environment. This environment is considered to
be safe and with no ongoing attacks. The reachability graph will capture low-
level critical assets and does not require deep-knowledge expertise about the IT
infrastructure. The goal here is to free the system administrator from providing
low-level details about the organization because this is done automatically by the
reachability graph. The generating of the reachability graph is as follows:
• We start the system that contains the critical assets.
• We start our security system.
• The monitored system calls are written to a log file.
• Our analysis phase parses the log file and organizes the monitored system
calls as shown in Figure 7.8.
• The reachability graph will be generated as shown in Figure 7.9.
As shown in 7.9, the critical file is accessed by two processes “notepad.exe”
and “explorer.exe”. If one of these processes is modified by an unauthorized user,
the security requirements of our critical file can be violated. Therefore, there is a
need to include the indirect reachability to the critical assets.
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Figure 7.8: Reading a text file by Notepad.
Figure 7.9: Direct reachability graph for reading a text file by Notepad.
7.6.2 Indirect reachability graph
Authors in [18] constructed what is known as “dependency graph” to simulate
the interactions between system objects to estimate the probability that a critical
assets is compromised if an attacked penetrated through some safe data paths. In
our approach, we need to catch the indirect reachability to our critical assets.
The analysis phase get more complex in order to include the indirect low-level
critical assets to the reachability graph. The log file is parsed starting the critical
asset identified by the asset owner. The direct reachability graph already captured
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all the processes having direct access to the critical file. We explore further and
find out the dependency of other system objects (processes or files) that have
interactions with these processes. Any found object will be added as a critical
asset to the reachability graph.
Figure 7.10: Accessing a file by Notepad, WordPad, and MS Paint.
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Figure 7.11: Direct reachability graph for accessing a file.
7.7 Agility of the Security System
Furthermore, we run yet another experiment to defend a critical asset identified
as abc.txt. We started this experiment by setting the security requirements for
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abc.txt according to Equations 1 to 3 explained in Section 4.5.1.2 as follows:
C = {(abc.txt, Pabc)}
Pabc = {(confidentiality, {}), (integrity, {}), (availability, {})}
This means that confidentiality, integrity, and availability for abc.txt is defended
against any process in the system. While our security system was running, we
tried to access abc.txt within the virtual machine using various processes as shown
in Figure 7.12 and indeed our security system enforced the security requirements
for file abc.txt by not allowing any process to access abc.txt.
We conducted another experiment, where we identified three critical assets
as abc.txt, abd.txt, and abe.txt. The security requirements were also identified
for each file. The security requirement for abc.txt is confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Similarly, the security requirements for abd.txt are integrity and avail-
ability whereas only availability is required for abe.txt. Therefore and according
to Equations 1 to 3 explained in Section 4.5.1.2, we have the followings:
C = {(abc.txt, Pabc), (abd.txt, Pabd), (abe.txt, Pabe)} (7.3)
Pabc = {(confidentiality, {Notepad}), (availability, {Notepad})} (7.4)
Pabd = {(integrity, {Notepad}), (availability, {Notepad})} (7.5)
Pabe = {(availability, {Notepad})} (7.6)
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(a) Could not modify abc.txt. (b) Could not open abc.txt.
(c) Could not delete abc.txt. (d) Could not rename abc.txt.
(e) Could not copy abc.txt.
(f) Could not open abc.txt By WordPad
from open menu.
Figure 7.12: File abc.txt is defended against any access from any process.
While our security system was running, we tried to access abc.txt within the
virtual machine using various processes as shown in Figure 7.13 and indeed our
security system enforced the security requirement for file abc.txt by not allowing
any process to access abc.txt. We were successful in reading abc.txt using Notepad
but we could not modify the file using Notepad as depicted in Figure 7.12(a).
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Other processes could not modify, rename, copy, or delete abc.txt. If the process
is not Notepad, our security system blocks all system calls containing abc.txt as a
file parameter. We also applied our security system to defend abd.txt and abe.txt
and similar results were obtained as the results shown in Figures 7.13 and 7.12.
(a) Notepad Could not open abc.txt. (b) WordPad could not Open abc.txt.
(c) MS Paint could not Open abc.png (d) WordPad could not Open abc.txt.
(e) Could not open abc.txt. (f) WordPad could not Open abc.txt.
Figure 7.13: No process can access the critical asset abc.txt
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7.8 Agility Against Real-World Ransomware
7.8.1 Anti Virus Guard
Environment Setup: We install Anti Virus Guard (AVG) on the guest machine
[135] and activate ransomware protection option which is part of AVG to test the
effect of real-world ransomware. After activation of ransomware protection, three
main menus appeared to set the needed parameters for ransomware protection as
in Figures 7.14, 7.15, and 7.17.
In Figure 7.14, you can choose between smart mode or strict mode. In smart
mode, any untrusted application will require your permission to change or to delete
any file inside your protected folders, while in strict mode all of the applications
will ask for your permission.
Figure 7.14: Protection modes in AVG.
In Figure 7.15, you can specify the folders to be protected. By default, AVG
will set these folders as appeared in Figure 7.15. It is easy to add more or adjust
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the type of files to be secured inside the protected folder as shown in Figure 7.16.
In Figure 7.17, you can specify the blocked or the allowed application so the
allowed application will not any more wait for permission to access the files inside
the selected folders while the blocked application will be blocked directly without
notification.
Figure 7.15: Default protected folders in AVG.
Figure 7.16: Files customization in AVG.
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Figure 7.17: Blocked/ Non-Blocking in AVG.
Running Crypto-ransomware: We used the same crypto-ransomware [137]
to test AVG ransomware protection environment. When we run ransomware.exe,
a pop-up menu appears asking the user to either grant or deny permission for
ransomware.exe to run. In the first experiment, we grant permission to ran-
somware.exe so it becomes one of the trusted applications. Therefore, all the files
will be encrypted by ransomware.exe whether they are in protected or unpro-
tected folder. In the second experiment, we deny permission to ransomware.exe
and therefore AVG blocked ransomware.exe and a report is generated by AVG
anti virus, as shown in Figures 7.18, 7.19, and 7.20.
In Figures 7.18 and 7.19, AVG anti virus generates a message detailing the
possible malicious action of encryption generated by ransomware.exe. AVG anti
virus also specifies the particular part of malicious action, which results in putting
ransomware.exe in the quarantine.
Later on when we try to download other files similar to ransomware.exe,
AVG anti virus will instantly quarantined these files. By double clicking on ran-
somware.exe a dialogue box is shown as in Figure 7.20. This dialogue box is
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Figure 7.18: AVG pop-up menu.
Figure 7.19: AVG anti virus response.
generated by Windows assuring that ransomware.exe has been blocked and hav-
ing no permission to run any more.
In the third experiment, we disable AVG anti virus, which is working as signa-
ture based, but not the ransomware protection option. By doing this, we ensure
that the ransomware.exe will not be deleted nor quarantined. After that, we run
ransomware.exe and a dialogue box pops up asking the user to block or allow the
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Figure 7.20: Windows response.
ransomware.exe as in Figure 7.21. When we choose allow application, all the files
will be encrypted whether they are in protected or unprotected folder. On the
other hand, choosing block will allow ransomware.exe to encrypt all files expect
those files in the protected folder. This is the desired and expected action of the
ransomware protection part in AVG.
Figure 7.21: AVG ransomware protection response.
7.8.2 Asset-Based Security System
We exposed our prototype to crypto-ransomware [137] to test the agility of our
security system in defending assets against a real-world ransomware attack. We
created two critical files “abd.txt” and “abe.txt” with their security requirements
as explained in Equations 4, 6, and 7. The crypto-ransomware was able to encrypt
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all files, as shown in Figure 7.22, except the two identified critical files namely,
“abd.txt” and “abe.txt”. We investigated the system calls that were blocked from
accessing “abd.txt” and we found out that our security system blocked NtWrite-
File, NtSetInformationFile, and NtDeleteFile. These are exactly the system calls
mapped to integrity and availability as explained in Section 4.5.1.2. Similarly, the
systems calls blocked from accessing “abe.txt” are exactly the ones correspond-
ing to NtReadFile and NtSetInformationFile. These are exactly the system calls
mapped to availability as also explained in Section 4.5.1.2. This shows that our
security system defends identified critical assets by insuring that their security
requirements are not violated. Our security system does not require the signa-
ture nor the behavior of the ransomware and it does not depend on information
provided by the ransomware. As such, our security system is purely asset-based.
7.8.3 AVG versus Our Security System
Our security system and AVG ransomware protection offer the protection to crit-
ical assets with some differences:
More Control: In our security system, we handle CIA which means if a
process wants to read a critical file, then this will be denied by our security system
but not by AVG as AVG protects against only modification and deletion.
More Safe: Compared with AVG, our security system works at the hypervisor
level having all the VMI advantages. An attacker can know and can bypass
AVG as shown in Figure 7.21. Furthermore, AVG information collection phase is
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Figure 7.22: Crypto-ransomware encrypting all but the two critical files.
vulnerable to attacks as compared to our offline information collection phase as
explained in section 4.5.1.
7.9 Security System Overhead
The performance penalty that comes with any new security approach is a cru-
cial measure of the viability of that approach. If the security approach hinders
performance to a degree where the system becomes unusable, then it’s nonviable.
Therefore, we dedicate this section to the overhead measurement of our security
system.
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7.9.1 Generated System Calls
We conducted these sets of experiments to measure how many system calls will be
captured by the monitoring phase. Subsequently, these system calls will be passed
to the analysis phase for further processing. We monitored four applications,
namely Notepad, WordPad, WinWord, and MS Paint. We count the system calls
generated by these four applications using two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, we configure AppTimer to open the application and close
the application. Then, a count of the system calls generated by the application
will be provided to us by our monitoring phase as shown in Figure 7.23. Table
7.10 shows the number of system calls generated from this scenario under the “No
Asset” column. This column is found under two categories: “Application Only”
and “System Related”. “Application Only” means the system calls generated from
the application itself (i.e., the system call contains the application name). “System
Related” means the system calls generated from the application itself as well as
other system calls generated because of other system applications. For example,
in Figure 7.23 there are two system calls generated by “explorer.exe” as a result
of executing “Notepad.exe” or system applications.
Table 7.10: Number of NT system calls: monitoring phase.
Application
System Calls
Application Only System Related
No Asset With Asset No Asset With Asset
Notepad 1419 2069 3349 4855
WordPad 10226 13470 12306 17104
WinWord 24096 31929 31094 51276
MS Paint 11043 14993 18152 19420
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Figure 7.23: Sample of generated system calls.
In the second scenario, we configure AppTimer to open the application, open
a file within the application, and then close the application. The count of system
calls generated by the application in this scenario will be provided to us by our
monitoring phase similar to the ones provided in Figure 7.23.
We calculated the numbers shown in Table 7.10 by eliminating all system calls
before the first system call generated by the application and also eliminating all
system calls appeared after the last system call generated by the application. We
then count the system calls in between. It should be also noted that each number
shown in Table 7.10 is the average of 5 runs. Examining Figure 7.24, we observe
the following:
• The number of system calls vary according to the application. For exam-
ple, “Notepad” generated the least number of system calls since it is a basic
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text editor meant for basic plain text entry [141]. The article [141] verifies
our findings in Table 7.10. The article states that WordPad is more ad-
vanced than Notepad and is meant for formatting and printing documents
like WinWord, but not quite as advanced as WinWord.
• The number of system calls needed to only open the application is less than
the system calls generated when the application used to open a file. This
increase is due to extra privileged file-related I/O operations.
• Our monitoring phase is not only affected by the system calls generated by
the monitored application but also by the system calls generated by other
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Figure 7.24: System calls generated by an application in different scenarios.
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7.9.2 System Call Filtering
This section deals with filtering and passing only the needed systems calls to our
analysis phase to insure the protection of assets. In Table 7.11, we count the num-
ber of system calls generated by specific application for specific NT system call.
As shown in the table’s first row, 11 NtCreateFile, 25 NtOpenFile, 2 NtReadFile,
and 54 NtSetInformationFile system calls were generated by Notepad for a total
of 92 system calls. These specific NT system calls are the ones that our analysis
phase will process. That is, for the case of “Notepad”, our analysis phase will
process only 92 system calls out of 4855 systems calls generated by “Notepad”.
Similarly, the same explanation can be applied to the rest of the applications.
Table 7.11: Number of specific NT system calls: monitoring phase.
Application System Calls
NtCreateFile NtOpenFile NtReadFile NtSetInformationFile
Notepad 11 25 2 54
WordPad 67 138 34 116
WinWord 208 244 156 306
MS Paint 49 100 37 151
In Figure 7.25, we capture the number of selected system calls for certain
application. We filter these captured system more and more to dig for certain
system calls. We find that the number of these system calls related to the ap-
plication itself, this result is expected as is, but a noticeable issue regarding the
number of system calls in WordPad and MS Paint where they look like already the
same in number when NtReadFile called but different when NtSetInformationFile
generated. It is obvious from Figure 7.25 that MS Paint has more number of
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calls of type NtSetInformationFile rather than WordPad, while NtOpenFile and
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Figure 7.25: Selected system calls grouped by system call.
In Figure 7.26, we grouped the number of system calls by the application and
not as in Figure 7.25 which grouped by system call. We can notice from Figure
7.26 that application WordPad looks differently than other applications when the
number of NtSetInformationFile is not the most called system call.
7.9.3 System Security Response Time
In these set of experiments, we configure AppTimer to open and close an appli-






























Figure 7.26: Selected system calls grouped by application.
Figure 7.27: Sample of AppTimer generated log file.
We measured the response time as shown in Table 7.12. The response time
is the average of 20 runs and is measured in seconds. The table also shows the
time measured when there is no asset accessed at all whether critical or non-
critical. Table 7.12 contains the response time measured by “AppTimer” when
specific application is opened. There are 5 columns, where all of them show
the response time using the corresponding application without opening a file.
Reference to Figure 4.10, the response time measured in Table 7.12 branches to
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“Normal Operation” after step #2. The experiments shown in Table 7.12 are
conducted as follows:
• Start AppTimer.
• Instruct AppTimer to open the application and record the start time.
• Once the application window opens, instruct AppTimer to record the end
time.
• The difference between these two recorded times is the response time.
The first column shows the response time when there is no VMI (i.e., the
monitoring phase is off). The second column contains the response time when
the monitoring phase is active and the monitoring is done to the 6 specific sys-
tem calls namely, NtWriteFile, NtReadFile, NtDeleteFile, NtSetInformationFile,
NtOpenFile, and NtCreateFile. The third column measures the response time
when all the NT system calls are monitored, while the fourth column shows the
response time when the monitoring and analysis phases are active and done to
the 6 specific system calls. The fifth column is taken when all the NT system calls
are monitored and analyzed.
We measured the response time as shown in Table 7.13. The response time
is the average of 20 runs and it is measured in seconds. The table also shows
the response time measured when there is non-critical asset accessed. Table 7.13
contains the response time measured by “AppTimer” when specific application
used to open non-critical asset. There are 5 columns, where all of them show
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Table 7.12: Response time without file access.
Application
No Asset
VMI VMI With Analysis
No Specific System NT System Specific System NT System
VMI Calls Calls Calls Calls
Notepad 0.0447 0.0611 0.1380 0.0620 0.1624
WordPad 0.0461 0.0770 0.1851 0.0616 0.2326
WinWord 0.0622 0.1233 0.6527 0.1232 0.6527
MS Paint 0.0696 0.1236 0.5437 0.1244 0.6769
the response time using the corresponding application opening a file. Reference
to Figure 4.10, the response time measured in Table 7.13 branches to “Normal
Operation” after step #4. The experiments shown in Table 7.13 are conducted as
follows:
• Start AppTimer.
• Instruct AppTimer to open the non-critical file using the application and
record the start time.
• Once the non-critical file is opened, instruct AppTimer to record the end
time.
• The difference between these two recorded times is the response time.
The first column shows the response time when there is no VMI (i.e., the
monitoring phase is off). The second column contains the response time when
the monitoring phase is active and the monitoring is done to the 6 specific sys-
tem calls namely, NtWriteFile, NtReadFile, NtDeleteFile, NtSetInformationFile,
NtOpenFile, and NtCreateFile. The third column measures the response time
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when all the NT system calls are monitored, while the fourth column shows the
response time when the monitoring and analysis phases are active and done to
the 6 specific system calls. The fifth column is taken when all the NT system calls
are monitored and analyzed.
Table 7.13: Response time with non-critical file access.
Application
Non-Critical Asset
VMI VMI With Analysis
No Specific System NT System Specific System NT System
VMI Calls Calls Calls Calls
Notepad 0.0462 0.0595 0.1378 0.0626 0.1930
WordPad 0.0462 0.0770 0.2013 0.0777 0.2483
WinWord 0.0622 0.1234 0.6682 0.1216 0.6298
MS Paint 0.0774 0.1238 0.5516 0.1244 0.7162
We measured the response time as shown in Table 7.14. The response time
is the average of 20 runs and it is measured in seconds. The table also shows
the response time measured when there is critical asset. Table 7.14 contains the
response time measured by “AppTimer” when specific application wants to open
the critical asset. There are 4 columns, where all of them show the response time
using the corresponding application trying to open the critical file. Reference to
Figure 4.10, the response time measured in Table 7.14 either branches to “Normal
Operation” or “Prevent system calls from continuity” after step #6. We will
branch to “Normal Operation” when the access to the critical file is not prevented
as shown in Table 7.14 column 3 and 4. If the access to the critical file is prevented,
then the response time is shown in columns 1 and 2. The experiments shown in
Table 7.14 are conducted as follows:
• Start AppTimer.
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• Instruct AppTimer to open the critical file using the application and record
the start time.
• The application may or may not open the file
– if the application is allowed to open the critical file, then Once the
critical file is opened, instruct AppTimer to record the end time.
– if the application is not allowed to open the critical file, then Once the
dialogue box, as shown Figure 7.13(c) appears, instruct AppTimer to
record the end time.
• The difference between these two recorded times is the response time.
In Table 7.14, our security system (including the monitoring phase, analysis
phase, and the decision phase) is active. The first column shows the response time
when the monitoring is done to the 6 specific system calls namely, NtWriteFile,
NtReadFile, NtDeleteFile, NtSetInformationFile, NtOpenFile, and NtCreateFile.
The second column measures the response time when all the NT system calls are
monitored. It should be noted that the response time shown in columns 1 and 2
is taken when access to the file is prevented.
The third column shows the response time when the monitoring is done to the
6 specific system calls while the fourth column is taken when all the NT system
calls are monitored. It should be noted that the response time shown in columns
3 and 4 is taken when access to the file is allowed.
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Specific System NT System Specific System NT System
Calls Calls Calls Calls
Notepad 0.0613 0.1303 0.0612 0.1370
WordPad 0.0768 0.1854 0.0770 0.2011
WinWord 0.1211 0.6215 0.1230 0.6287
MS Paint 0.1237 0.4972 0.1240 0.5285
7.10 Performance Ratio
Table 7.15 shows the performance ratio for the 6 specific system calls. It should
be noted that the performance ratio in:
• The first column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from the
fourth column in Table 7.12 by the first column in the same Table.
• The second column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the fourth column in Table 7.13 by the first column in the same Table.
• The third column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the first column in Table 7.14 by the first column in Table 7.13.
• The fourth column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the third column in Table 7.14 by the first column in Table 7.13.
Table 7.16 shows the performance ratio for NT system calls. It should be noted
that the performance ratio in:
• The first column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from the
fifth column in Table 7.12 by the first column in the same Table.
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• The second column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the fifth column in Table 7.13 by the first column in the same Table.
• The third column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the second column in Table 7.14 by the first column in Table 7.13.
• The fourth column is the result of dividing the corresponding entries from
the fourth column in Table 7.14 by the first column in Table 7.13.
Table 7.15: Performance ratio for the 6 specific system calls.
No Asset Non-Critical Prevented Not
Asset Prevented
Notepad 1.385 1.354 1.326 1.323
WordPad 1.336 1.681 1.662 1.665
WinWord 1.980 1.954 1.946 1.977
MS Paint 1.786 1.608 1.598 1.603
Table 7.16: Performance ratio for the NT system calls.
No Asset Non-Critical Prevented Not
Asset Prevented
Notepad 3.631 4.177 2.820 2.965
WordPad 5.044 5.373 4.012 4.351
WinWord 10.493 10.126 9.991 10.106
MS Paint 9.725 9.259 6.427 6.831
From Figure 7.28 we notice that the latency here is not more than 10X in
worst case and around 2X in best case.
From Figure 7.29 we notice that analyzing only specific system calls generates
latency not more than 2X in worst case and around 1.3X in best case, which is a























Figure 7.28: Performance ratio for the NT system calls.
We have to mention that our security system overhead using DRAKVUF 0.4
is approximately 38X in best case and up to 62X in worst case. This is very
costly and further details of these results can be found in Appendix B. We are
thankful to DRAKVUF version 0.5 [142] released in 30th June 2017 and Xen 4.9
[143] released in 28th June 2017. The new release includes core modifications to
the in-depth execution tracing of arbitrary binaries as well as modifications to
DRAKVUF system call plugin. These modifications enable DRAKVUF to print
detailed arguments for Windows guest. As such, our security system is improved
significantly and this is shown by examining the results obtained using DRAKVUF























Figure 7.29: Performance ratio for the 6 specific system calls.
7.11 On the Scalability of the Security System
As previously mentioned that the tool used to conduct VMI is DRAKVUF. One
major reason behind using this binary analysis tool is scalability. DRAKVUF
achieves scalability as mentioned by [144] [130] and hence it is capable of analyzing
large corpus of data with minimum overhead [145] [130]. Furthermore, critical
assets are few can be counted on the fingers of one hand [18], so the analyzed data
is not large.
Therefore, the scalability of our security system is inherited from DRAKVUF.
In addition, we conducted an experiment where we run 4 different VMs on top
of our host machine as shown in Figures 7.30 and 7.31. The objective of this
set of experiments is to consider CPU utilization measurements for the proposed
system and how they vary with an increase in the number of VMs served, and
the number of attacks per VM. That is, we want to characterize how our security
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system scales with more VMs and more attacks per VM. Minimal consumption
of the CPU and memory usage of the 4 VMs is shown in 7.32. That is, the CPU
utilization when having 4 VMs is very similar to the CPU utilization when we
run only one VM. Since VMs are seen as user processes by the hypervisor, the
real scalability issue is at the hypervisor level and this has been proved by many
published papers [144] [130] [145] [18].
Figure 7.30: Linux Dom0 and the 4 Windows VMs.
Figure 7.31: Running Multiple VMs.
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Figure 7.32: Utilization of guests CPUs.
7.12 Performance Remarks
As outlined in [146], security systems follow an iterative process that can be
broken down into four phases: predict, prevent, detect, and respond. Prediction
assesses attack surface and prevention try to reduce such surface. Therefore,
both of prediction and prevention rely on attacks. In our security system, we
rely only on the defender side and therefore our security system does detection.
The detection process is done based on pre-determined rules obtained from the
reachability graph. This is very similar to file permission in any operating system.
As such, techniques such as precision and recall are unsuitable performance
measures for our security model. Precision and recall consider actual and predicted
instances. Since our security system does not consider the attacker side, we will
never know the actual instances. Furthermore, we will never know the predicted
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instances since our security system is proactive as outlined in table 4.1.
We also studied some datasets used in security analysis for intrusion detection
such as NSL-KDD, which contains datasets labeled as either normal or abnormal.
If the dataset is labelled abnormal, then it contains one of 24 different kinds of
attacks. These 24 attacks are grouped into 4 classes: Probe, DoS, R2L (Remote-
to-Local), and U2R (User-to-Root) attacks [147] [148].
None of these classes target our assets file or process as the following:
• Probing or information collection is done before our security system is de-
ployed. After that, our security system relies on capturing and monitoring
system calls based on the collected information. If an attacker probes a VM,
the collected information is safe since it is stored at the hypervisor level.
Therefore, probing attacks are outside the scope of our security system.
• Availability as defined in [59] has three attributes namely, response time,
expiration, and resource allocation. As long as the asset (a physical file in
our system) exists, a resource is allocated. If the physical file exists but
can not be accessed because the service (process) used to reach the file
is unavailable, then the response time is affected. In this case, only the
reachability to the file is affected.
Therefore, in our security system, the availability is limited to only physical
files. Our security system is not concerned with the availability of processes
or services (DoS attacks) because our focus is to protect physical files and
insure that these physical files are not detected and not available to unau-
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thorized users.
• Both of U2R and R2L are considered as gaining unauthorized access to
assets. Since our security system sits at the hypervisor level, it will not
be affected by gaining unauthorized access in the guest OS. Furthermore,
our security system starts defending from the system calls level which is
a step before gaining unauthorized access because every action done by






There is no doubt that there is a vicious battle between attackers and defend-
ers. Researchers as well as security practitioners have developed defense systems.
These defense systems are built to defend against certain attack(s). To design
such defense systems, attack vectors need to be examined. For example, if we
want to design a signature-based defense system, then we have to collect previous
attack vectors and develop signatures for these attacks. Similarly, behavior-based
security systems need to study the behavior of attack vectors to try and predict
future attacks.
As such, a vital input parameter to these defense systems is the attack vector.
The problem here is that the attack vector is designed by the attacker. If the
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attacker changes the attack vector, then the defense system becomes obsolete. In
our work we are proposing to design a defense system that has no input parameters
from attackers.
This led us to think differently by proposing an asset-based security system
which is not inheriting the weaknesses in previous defense systems. Our security
system depends only on the defender which leaves attackers in a learning phase
regarding our security system. Our security system reacts prior to an attack.
This thesis argues that the trend of constantly chasing changing attack vectors
is contributing to the continuity of attackers-led security vicious cycle. Attackers
are leading and defenders are learning. This paradigm needs to be shifted in a
way that defenders are leading and attackers are learning.
We started this thesis by studying the need for security in by collecting infor-
mation about the destructive effects of attacks through cyber space in addition to
the financial losses due to these attacks. Then, we surveyed the existing security
solutions for such attacks. We also explored the reasons behind the success of
these destructive attacks and the fail of the defense lines.
This thesis proposes an asset-based security system where security practition-
ers build their security systems based on information they own. The idea is to
completely rely of ourselves in building security systems and require nothing from
attackers. This way, attackers chase defenders which will not just level the security
playing field but will give advantage to defenders.
Our security system consists of 4 phases namely, information collection, moni-
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toring, decision, and feedback. Information collection phase prepares and collects
the information needed for the security system to start its functionality by taking
information from the asset owner about the critical assets and by building the
reachability graph to reach those assets. The monitoring phase includes collecting
system calls and parsing them to be processed in the decision phase which com-
pares pre-collected information from the information collection phase with ongoing
collected information from the monitoring phase to put the final decision for the
captured system calls to be either terminated or passed. Finally, the feedback
phase is important in applying and accommodating changes in the pre-collected
information.
In this thesis, we propose a proactive asset based defense scheme using policies
in a virtualized environment that can prevent illegal access to assets. Furthermore,
we implemented the proposed scheme using Xen as a hypervisor and DRAKVUF
as hypervisor level monitoring agent to monitor and prevent illegal access to assets
within a guest operating system running windows.
As a proof of concept, we evaluated our security model using ransomware real-
world attacks. The obtained results show that we achieved promising results with
acceptable degradation in performance. Finally, we evaluated the performance of
the solution and found it to be promising with some issues. As such, the response
time overhead of our security system and the design of our security system can
be accomplished as operating-system-independent.
We outlined the architecture of the proposed asset-based security system and
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developed a prototype of our system. We also conducted extensive evaluation ex-
periments to evaluate the feasibility and performance of our prototype. Obtained
results are encouraging and show the agility of our prototype to ransomware at-
tacks.
8.2 Concluding Remarks
We started our security system prototype evaluation by a verification and valida-
tion step. In this step, we started by running the Task Manager within the virtual
machine to provide the list of the running processes. Indeed, our security system
prototype provided the same list of running processes. We also exposed our pro-
totype to a real-world ransomware virus. Again our prototype was successful in
protecting critical assets from the ransomware effect and encryption.
To measure our prototype overhead, we conducted a set of experiments to
count the number of system calls to estimate the efforts done by our prototype.
We also measured the time needed to open an application in different scenarios.
The overhead of our security system prototype was acceptable.
We leave the reader with a comparison conclusion as shown in Table 8.1. The
Table compares our security system to a non-asset-based security system. Our
security system’s strength comes from its asset-awareness property which enables
proactive prevention security measures.
General attacks hit as many as possible targets and these attacks will not
be effective when our proposed security system is deployed. This is because of
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Table 8.1: Comparing Asset-Based and Non-Asset-Based Security Systems.
Phase Security System
Non-Asset-Based Asset-Based
Collector Collects all Collects all
Parser System calls Sequence of System calls SubsetContent Content-unaware Content-aware
Decision Maker After the fact Before the fact
Generator Attack-Based Defender-Based
Tuner MTD-impossible MTD-possible
customization to every standalone system will make the same attack vector useless
against our system. For example, if the attack process is named “notepad.exe” and
we used that process name as an allowed process to access our critical asset files
in one system. The other systems can customize the name of the allowed process
to be for example “mynotepad56.exe”. Therefore, “notepad.exe” malicious code
process will not harm the critical assets. Moreover, if the attacker reconnaissance
phase is done on our security system to know the process name we used as an
allowed process, then the attacker will need to change his process name to the
discovered one and must do that for every standalone defense system to hit as
many targets as possible.
Also this mechanism can work in the same system. If we have 2 files using the
same program or used by 2 users, we can provide different name for every user
so we can make 2 processes such as renaming “notepad.exe” as “hisnotepad.exe”
and “yournotepad.exe”. Then, we assign each one of these processes to different
critical asset file. In this case, if the attacker succeeds in penetrating one of the
asset files, the attacker has to initiate a new attack vector with new tuning to get
the other file. this has to be done even if the 2 critical files are at the same system
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using the same program.
One main disadvantage of our security system is the following. If the attacker
knows the name of the asset file and the process name accessing that file, then the
attacker can utilize this information to bypass our system defense mechanism to
gain access to the asset file. But this penetration is still defender-based game not
attacker-based game even though that weakness can be waived by using MTD.
8.3 Asset-Based Security System Assumptions
We designed and implemented a prototype of our security system assuming the
following:
• Asset scope: As shown in Table 2.5, assets can be physical, t-ICT, e-ICT,
or e-information. Since our proposed asset-based security system is asset-
based, the scope of assets that our proposed system is based on needs to
be clearly defined. Assets span over a wide range of entities as defined in
[18] and [53]. Files, processes, sockets, physical entities can be considered as
assets. In this thesis, we are focusing on protecting information which is one
of the main five assets mentioned in Table 2.5. Specifically, we are concerned
with protecting files. Files can be protected by controlling the physical files
themselves and protecting reaching those files through processes. As such,
this thesis considers asset as file, and monitors the system calls to reach
those files through processes. So, the scope of our asset is mainly starts
from a file, then other processes and files could be added as assets through
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the reachability graph.
• Information Collection Phase Immunity: The information collection
phase as discussed in section 4.5.1 is assumed to be done when the system
is offline. That is, the information collection phase needs to be done before
system deployment. This is done and assumed also in [18]. Once the infor-
mation is collected, this information will be used to determine the critical
assets (including files and processes) that the user needs to protect. Since,
later security decisions will depend on the information collected, immunity
to this phase is necessary for validity of the system. Therefore, each time
information phase needs to be executed, it must be done offline.
• Virtualization Environment: Our security system monitors system calls
utilizing VMI, which enables our security system to be agentless and does
in-depth execution tracing of arbitrary binaries. Therefore, a virtualization
environment is assumed. As such, our system system will be able to catch
and analyze every system call generated by the guest OS by interacting with
the hypervisor.
8.4 Asset-Based Security System Limitations
• Availability scope: Availability as defined in [59] has three attributes
namely, response time, expiration, and resource allocation. As long as the
asset (a physical file in our system) exists, a resource is allocated. If the
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physical file exists but can not be accessed because the service (process)
used to reach the file is unavailable, then the response time is affected. In
this case, only the reachability to the file is affected.
Therefore, in our security system, the availability is limited to only physical
files. Our security system is not concerned with the availability of processes
(services) because our focus is to protect physical files and insure that these
physical files are not detected and not available to unauthorized users.
• Guest Operating System Compromise: If the attacker can compromise
the guest OS, the system calls table can also can compromised. Therefore,
an attacker can manipulate the system call table and then our system will
not be able to catch critical system calls related to critical assets. As we are
depending mainly on monitoring system calls in our system,then a compro-
mise to the guest OS will harm our proposed security system.
• Hypervisor Compromise: Although seldom and complicated, attacks
can reach hypervisors [149]. These attacks need sophisticated tools and
skills but attacks knows as hyperjacking [149] could be done by (a) adding
a rogue hypervisor on the top or beneath the original hypervisor and (b)
directly controlling the original hypervisor. As such, if an attacker can reach
the hypervisor by hyperjacking, then our system can be disabled making
critical asset vulnerable to threats. System call interception techniques can
not monitor the malicious drivers and rootkits which could be monitored
using DRAKVUF at hypervisor level [150].
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8.5 Directions for Future Work
Future directions for this work include, improving the performance, implementing
facilities for more fine grained access control policies with MTD, and expanding
this implementation to support Linux, Android or any other OS.
A fundamental paradigm shift is MTD systems where attack surfaces are al-
ways dynamically moving. MTD systems are only leveling the game between
defenders are attackers and still require information on the attack scenarios in
order to design proper adaptive and dynamic security systems. A key challenge
to MTD systems is how to control such a dynamic environment so that defenders
are not confused. As such, MTD systems need to impose this dynamic change
from the perspective of attackers and not defenders.
To enhance the performance ratio in our security system, the concept of read-
only file which used in Windows can be applied here to reduce the response time
overhead. That is, using access mask bits [151] supported by the Operating System
can relief the defender. Also if we customize our monitor system it can improve
the performance significantly as it consume most of the time.
To expand this implementation to support Linux, Android or any other OS.
For example in the case of Linux we need to install any Linux version as guest OS,
then we need to monitor the system calls were generated from it, analyze them
with their parameters. Also a definition for every system call is needed to be
familiar with them. Finally we can apply our operational architecture to Linux.
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UPDATED 7/10/2017 DRAKVUF now requires Xen 4.9. Please pay attention to
the updated VM configuration specifying the altp2m option for a domain.
The following packages are normally required to build Xen and DRAKVUF
on Debian based Linux distros. The system has been mainly tested on Debian
Jessie and Ubuntu 14.04 LTS.
sudo apt-get install wget git bcc bin86 gawk bridge-utils iproute libcurl3
libcurl4-openssl-dev bzip2 pciutils-dev build-essential make gcc clang libc6-dev
libc6-dev-i386 linux-libc-dev zlib1g-dev python-dev python-pip libncurses5-dev
patch libvncserver-dev libssl-dev libsdl-dev iasl libbz2-dev e2fslibs-dev git-core
uuid-dev ocaml libx11-dev bison flex ocaml-findlib xz-utils gettext libyajl-dev
libpixman-1-dev libaio-dev libfdt-dev cabextract libglib2.0-dev autoconf automake
libtool check libjson-c-dev libfuse-dev checkpolicy liblzma-dev autoconf-archive
kpartx python-capstone
We will be installing a slightly modified version of Xen 4.8 that includes a
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Here we added the experiment result from the previous version of DRAKVUF ver-
sion 0.4 which is related to system security response time, unfortunately this result
are no more valid also we could not complete some of the table as DRAKVUF
version 0.4 is not working anymore.
Table B.1 time shown in seconds consumed in Guest OS when application
opened alone, shows time is seconds needed to run a specific program in different
situations and scenarios we run each one of them about 100 time, then we took
the average, we have three columns, all of them shows the time for all application
solo i.e. without opening a file using that application, the steps will be done
according to the approach figure are step one and step two, we are using a program
called APPTIMER to record the time, it works like the following procedure: Start
Apptimer. Instruct Apptimer to open the application and record the START time.
Once the application window opens, instruct Apptimer to record the END time.
The difference between these columns is that the time recorded in the first column
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is when there is no monitoring at all i.e. the plugins are off, the second column
contains the time when the monitoring done to specific system calls namely they
are NtWriteFile, NtReadFile, NtDeleteFile, NtSetInformationFile, NtOpenFile,
and NtCreateFile. The third column time is taken when all the NT system calls
are monitored.
Table B.1: Response time Without File Access.
Application Without File AccessCode off Specific System Call NT System Calls
Notepad 0.042 1.591 1.767
WordPad 0.045 2.134 2.306
MS Paint 0.070 3.220 3.884
In Table B.2 time is shown in seconds consumed in Guest OS when noncritical
file accessed by an application, there are three columns which record the time
needed to access a noncritical file by an application, the step done in this table
starts from step one to up to step four, following the next procedure: Start App-
timer. Instruct Apptimer to open the application and record the start time. Once
the application window opens the noncritical file, instruct Apptimer to record the
END time.
Table B.2: Response time when noncritical file accessed.
Application Without File AccessCode off Specific System Call NT System Calls
Notepad 0.040 1.669 1.693
WordPad 0.050 2.627 2.821
MS Paint 0.067 3.315 3.951
In Table B.3 time is shown in seconds consumed in Guest OS when critical
file accessed the time shown for critical files when prevented from access and
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when allowed, for prevented case there is no access to the file at all, to ensure
this criterion we need the seven steps from the first one to the last one with the
following procedure: Start Apptimer. Instruct Apptimer to open the application
and record the start time. Once the application window opens, the application
tries to access the critical file (i.e., open the critical file). Once a message is
displayed to indicate access denial, Apptimer records the END time, for level
three case where the process has given full access to the file, six steps is enough
to ensure the criteria with the following procedure: Start Apptimer. Instruct
Apptimer to open the application and record the start time. Once the application
window (if allowed) opens the critical file, instruct Apptimer to record the END
time.
Table B.3: Response time when critical file accessed.
App. Prevent No PreventSpecific System NT System Specific System NT System
Calls Calls Calls Calls
Notepad 1.707 1.783 1.659 1.801
WordPad 2.751 4.054 2.595 2.888
MS Paint 3.389 4.192
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